Are men's preferences for couple equity misperceived? Evidence from six countries

Teodora Boneva, Ana Brás-Monteiro, Marta Golin, and Christopher Rauh*

April 11, 2025

Abstract

Gender gaps in labor supply and household responsibilities persist. Using representative survey data from 24,000 respondents across six countries, this paper explores the actual and perceived preferences of men for couple equity. We document that in all six countries the majority of men state they prefer an equitable division of tasks within the household. At the same time, the actual share of men preferring couple equity is systematically underestimated in all six countries. The perceived shares vary substantially across the population, and they are positively associated with respondents' own preferences for couple equity. Providing respondents with truthful information about the actual share of men preferring couple equity in their country shifts individual beliefs, own stated preferences for couple equity, as well as the willingness to pay for it. The estimated treatment effects are mainly driven by respondents who initially underestimated the actual share.

JEL: J22, J13, I26

Keywords: Subjective expectations, pluralistic ignorance, identity, norms, couple equity, parental labor supply

*Boneva: University of Bonn (email: tboneva@uni-bonn.de). Brás-Monteiro: University of Zurich (ana.brasmonteiro@econ.uzh.ch). Golin: ILO & University of Zurich (golin@ilo.org). Rauh: Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (IAE-CSIC), Barcelona School of Economics, University of Cambridge (email: cr542@cam.ac.uk). We thank Alessia Pulvirenti and Magdalena Llompart Frau for their excellent research assistance, and Simone Jost for her excellent administrative support. We are further grateful to seminar and conference participants for helpful comments and suggestions. This project has been funded by the European Union (ERC, BELIEFS, ERC-2020-STG-948371). Views and opinions expressed are however those of the authors only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Research Council. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them. The views expressed herein also do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Labour Organization. Boneva further acknowledges funding by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) under Germany's Excellence Strategy – EXC 2126/1– 390838866. Rauh acknowledges financial support from the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S), funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033, and by AEI/MICINN (ATR2023-144291). This study has been approved by the ethics committee of the University of Bonn. The survey experiment was pre-registered at the AEA RCT Registry (AEARCTR-0012817 and AEARCTR-0012926).

1 Introduction

Gender gaps in earnings increase markedly upon the arrival of the first child. This pattern is largely attributable to mothers reducing their work hours and assuming a greater share of unpaid household responsibilities, while fathers typically maintain full-time employment.[1] A substantial body of research has examined the factors influencing maternal labor supply, identifying perceived societal norms or identity-related considerations as an important driver of this decision.[2] When societies are in a phase of transition, such societal norms may change rapidly. A key insight from the recent literature is that in those periods beliefs about prevalent norms may be miscalibrated – a phenomenon referred to as 'pluralistic ignorance' – which can trap individuals in traditional gender roles (Bursztyn, González and Yanagizawa-Drott 2020; Bursztyn et al. 2023; Cortés et al. forthcoming). This literature has almost exclusively focused on explaining *women*'s labor supply decisions, and identifying ways to promote gender equality by raising female employment. Little attention has been drawn to *men*'s labor supply decisions or the factors that deter fathers from reducing their work hours. Arguably, when work demands make it challenging for both spouses to maintain full-time employment while raising young children, one potential pathway to achieving greater gender equality is for *both* partners to reduce their work hours and share the unpaid household responsibilities more equitably.[3]

This raises the question of why fathers are so reluctant to reduce their labor supply. It is conceivable that identity-related considerations or perceived behavioral prescriptions are also an important driver of male labor supply decisions.[4] For men, failing to align with traditional gender roles – such as not being the main breadwinner or taking on household responsibilities – may threaten their identity and result in a loss of utility. If gender identity

[1] See, e.g., Kleven, Landais and Søgaard (2019a); Kleven et al. (2019b) and Kleven, Landais and Leite-Mariante (forthcoming) for recent estimates of the child penalty across different countries, or Cortés and Pan (2023) for a recent review.

[2] Bertrand (2011) and Giuliano (2020) provide recent reviews on the role of gender norms and culture.

[3] Relatedly, using data from Norway, Andresen and Nix (2022) demonstrate that in same-sex female couples both partners incur an earnings penalty, and that the drop in the birth mothers' earnings five years after birth is statistically indistinguishable from the earnings drop of the co-mothers.

[4] Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2010) introduce the concept of identity into economics, and define it as a person's 'sense of self', which is associated with a sense of belonging to different social categories and the specific prescribed behaviors for individuals within these social categories.

considerations play a role, men's preferences for the division of labor within the household are likely shaped by their beliefs about what *other* men consider desirable. Men who believe that most other men have a preference for being the main breadwinner may perceive this traditional allocation of tasks as socially desirable and deviating from it as costly. However, these beliefs may not be well calibrated, especially in times when behavioral prescriptions or norms are in a period of transition. Men might mistakenly believe that the majority of men in their country prefer the traditional male breadwinner model, causing them to conform to this perceived prescribed behavior. This may create a self-perpetuating equilibrium, hindering progress towards gender equality. In such an equilibrium, correcting beliefs about the preferences of other men holds tremendous potential for fostering gender equality.

This paper aims to shed light on men's preferences for couple equity and the extent to which these preferences are misperceived. More specifically, our goal is to explore the following questions: What share of men state they prefer an equitable division of tasks within the household, and does this share vary across countries? On average, are beliefs about the actual share of men preferring couple equity correct, or is there evidence of systematic misperceptions? And can an informational intervention that provides respondents with truthful information about the actual share of men preferring couple equity in their country shift individual beliefs, stated preferences for couple equity, and the willingness to pay for it?

Observed labor supply and unpaid work decisions are likely to be driven by a combination of preferences, beliefs, and constraints. In the context of couples with young children, observed choices are also likely to be the outcome of a bargaining process, in which the preferences of the spouses may not necessarily align. It is therefore not possible to infer individual preferences for couple equity from observed choices (Manski 2004). For this reason, to study the questions posed above, this study introduces a novel survey methodology to elicit individual preferences for couple equity. Respondents are presented with a set of realistic hypothetical decision scenarios and asked to choose between two options: in option A, household tasks and paid work are equally shared, reflecting 'couple equity', while in option B, the male partner focuses on paid work and the female partner takes on more unpaid work, representing the 'male breadwinner model'. We elicit respondents' own pref-

erences for couple equity, and measure respondents' beliefs about the preferences of men in their country. Data were collected from a representative sample of 24,000 childless adults aged 18–45 across six countries: Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the United States. We deliberately chose to survey childless adults in order to limit concerns related to ex-post rationalization. The surveys were conducted online in collaboration with a professional survey company, utilizing a quota-based sampling approach to ensure the samples broadly represent the populations of interest in terms of gender, education, and region. The study employs a two-wave design, with 1,000 respondents participating in the baseline survey (wave 1) and 3,000 respondents in the main survey (wave 2) within each country. The data allow us to investigate whether beliefs about men's preferences for couple equity are associated with own preferences for couple equity, and to explore whether men's preferences for couple equity are systematically misperceived. Additionally, an embedded information treatment in wave 2 provides respondents with truthful information about the proportion of men in their country who prefer couple equity, as determined from wave 1, which allows us to study whether the information treatment has an impact on own preferences for couple equity and the willingness to pay for it. Surveys were initially developed in English and translated using state-of-the-art translation procedures to ensure cross-national consistency.

Using data from both survey waves, we document widespread misperceptions about the preferences of men. In all six countries, the majority of men prefer an equitable division of tasks within the household. At the same time, respondents in all six countries on average believe that only a minority of men prefer this division of tasks.[5] The average perception gaps are sizable. In the hypothetical scenario in which respondents are asked to imagine they have one child, for example, the average perception gap across all six countries is estimated to be 26 percentage points, and it ranges from 16 to 36 percentage points. In Spain, which is the country with the largest average perception gap, 84% of men state they prefer an equitable division of tasks, but the share is only perceived to be 48%. We further document that widespread misperceptions about the preferences of men are prevalent both among men as well as among women. Misperceptions tend to be somewhat larger (in absolute terms)

[5]We incentivize the guesses with bonus payments for guessing correctly. More information is provided below.

for female than for male respondents.

A valid concern in surveys like ours is that respondents may have felt that they had to respond in a specific, socially desirable way when being asked about their preferred allocation of tasks within the household. We took several steps to mitigate this concern and also directly test for the presence of social desirability bias. As we will discuss in more detail below, we conclude that social desirability bias is unlikely to be a main driver of our results.

In all six countries, we further document that there is a considerable degree of heterogeneity in beliefs about men's preferences. Moreover, we show that individual beliefs significantly predict own preferences for couple equity, both for male as well as for female respondents. For men, a one-percentage-point increase in the perceived share of men preferring couple equity is associated with a 0.72-percentage point (p-value$<$ 0.001) increase in own preferences for couple equity, whereas for women the estimated coefficient is 0.13 (p-value$<$ 0.001). These results are robust to the inclusion of a rich set of individual control variables as well as country-region fixed effects.

Having established that beliefs are on average miscalibrated, and having documented that beliefs are associated with own preferences for couple equity, we explore whether providing respondents with truthful information about the actual share of men preferring couple equity in their country can shift beliefs, respondents' own stated preferences for couple equity, as well as the willingness to pay for it. On average, individuals update their beliefs about the share of men preferring couple equity in the expected direction in response to the treatment. Moreover, the treatment also significantly shifts own stated preferences for couple equity.[6] Across the full sample, treated individuals are 3.7 percentage points more likely to state they prefer couple equity (p-value$<$ 0.001), which constitutes a 5.3% increase over the control group mean. The treatment effects are primarily driven by male respondents and respondents whose priors lie below the actual shares. Across the full sample, we estimate that men are 5.2 percentage points (p-value$<$ 0.001) more likely to state they prefer couple equity in response to the treatment, which is equivalent to a 9.0% increase over the control group

[6]As we explain in more detail below, we took great care to mitigate concerns related to experimenter demand effects, e.g., by obfuscating the treatment such that it could be interpreted as information about whether one qualifies for extra payment.

mean. While there are considerable differences across countries with respect to the actual and perceived shares of men preferring couple equity, which we discuss in more detail below, we estimate similar treatment effect sizes for all six countries on individual preferences for couple equity, and we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the average treatment effects are the same for all countries.

Our results are corroborated in an additional analysis in which we estimate the effect of the treatment on a continuous measure of individual willingness to pay for couple equity. On average, treated individuals are willing to forgo larger monetary amounts in order to achieve couple equity, indicating a stronger preference for this option. In Germany, for example, treated respondents are on average willing to forgo 5,260 Euro more in gross annual household income in order to achieve couple equity compared to control group respondents, which corresponds to a 35% increase over the control group mean.

We also examine whether the treatment raises support for external initiatives supporting the involvement of fathers in the upbringing of their children. In most countries, learning about the fact that a majority of men in their country already prefer an equitable division of tasks within the household does not further increase incentivized donations to a charity or support for governmental action promoting the involvement of fathers. The only exception is Germany, where being informed about the actual share of men preferring couple equity significantly raises donations by 2.9 percentage points from a control group baseline of 42%.

Our main results are remarkably consistent across countries. We deliberately chose to conduct this study in six countries with varying gender norms. The advantage of this cross-country approach is that we can explore whether misperceptions are prevalent across different countries and cultural contexts. We document substantial misperceptions about the preferences of men in all six countries, despite the fact that the actual share of men preferring couple equity varies considerably across the countries in our sample. The actual share of men preferring an equal division of tasks within the household ranges from 56% (Poland) to 84% (Spain). We note that these sizable differences across countries dwarf the gender differences in preferences for couple equity that we document within countries. As one would expect, we detect a strong positive correlation between the country-level share of men prefer-

ring couple equity and a Gender Equality Index we construct based on UN data. Moreover, we find that the more gender equal a society is, the larger are average misperceptions about the preferences of men (in absolute terms). When countries are in a phase of rapid transition, beliefs about prevalent preferences or opinions may not be updating as rapidly, especially if people do not frequently talk about the topic. In fact, the majority of respondents (52%) in our sample report discussing this topic rarely or very rarely with their male relatives or friends. Consistent with this interpretation, we document significantly larger perception gaps among respondents who rarely discuss this topic.

Overall, our results are in line with the interpretation that men in modern societies may be trapped in an equilibrium in which a majority of men already privately endorse progressive gender norms but incorrectly believe that other men in their country are less progressive than them. If beliefs about rapidly changing societal norms are miscalibrated, this may hinder further societal progress towards gender equality. In such an equilibrium, correcting misperceptions offers significant opportunities. The results of our information experiment suggest that further progress may be achieved if it was communicated more widely that men's views on gender equality may in fact be more progressive than many people think.

Our study is most closely related to earlier work examining misperceptions about attitudes toward female labor supply. Bursztyn, González and Yanagizawa-Drott (2020) show that correcting widespread misperceptions about gender norms regarding female labor force participation increases the willingness of Saudi men to allow their wives to work outside the home and improves women's labor market outcomes. Bursztyn et al. (2023) document misperceptions of gender norms related to women's right to work outside the house and affirmative action in 60 different countries. Cortés et al. (forthcoming) study individual attitudes and perceived norms toward working mothers in the United States. The authors demonstrate that a large majority of US respondents think they hold more progressive views compared to their peers, and that randomly exposing respondents to information about peer beliefs leads to a shift in attitudes toward mothers working and increases donations to a non-profit organization advocating for women in the workplace. Grewenig, Lergetporer and Werner (2020) study gender norms and labor supply expectations among German adolescents, and

show that providing information about prevalent norms affects the labor supply expectations of girls. Our focus is instead on the perceived and actual preferences of men. Using data from six countries, we document widespread misperceptions about the preferences of men for reducing their work hours when they have young children. Moreover, we show that correcting beliefs about the prevalent attitudes among other men in the same country shifts individual preferences toward an equitable division of tasks within the household.

This paper relates to two main strands of the literature. First, a large literature examines how gender norms and identity considerations shape women's labor market outcomes. For example, studies have examined the role of cultural norms in explaining women's labor supply (Fernández, Fogli and Olivetti 2004; Fortin 2005; Fernandez and Fogli 2009; Boelmann, Raute and Schönberg forthcoming), the role of peers in maternal labor supply decisions (Nicoletti, Salvanes and Tominey 2018; Cavapozzi, Francesconi and Nicoletti 2021), or the role of gender identity in explaining the relative income of spouses within households (Bertrand, Kamenica and Pan 2015). Several studies also examine the historical roots and persistence of gender norms (Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn 2013; Hansen, Jensen and Skovsgaard 2015). Relatedly, recent work explores the role of preferences and norms in the gendered division of housework (Stratton 2012; Auspurg, Iacovou and Nicoletti 2017; Siminski and Yetsenga 2022).[7]

Second, it contributes to the growing literature documenting widespread misperceptions about prevalent attitudes or norms across many different settings (see Bursztyn and Yang 2022 for recent review). When social norms are in a phase of transition, individual beliefs about prevalent norms may not update as rapidly, giving rise to a phenomenon referred to as 'pluralistic ignorance' (Allport, 1924; Miller and McFarland, 1987). Recent work has documented perception gaps across a range of different domains, and highlights the importance of informational interventions in closing perception gaps; see, e.g., Bursztyn, González and Yanagizawa-Drott (2020), Bursztyn et al. (2023) or Cortés et al. (forthcoming) for evidence on pluralistic ignorance related to female labor supply, Andre et al. (2024*a*,*b*) on misperceptions about prevalent climate norms, or Grigorieff, Roth and Ubfal (2020) and Alesina, Miano and Stantcheva (2023) on misperceptions about immigrants' characteristics.

[7]More broadly, our study also relates to the literature examining the role of social identity considerations in other labor market decisions, e.g., which occupation to sort into (Oh, 2023; Delfino, 2024).

2 Sample and Survey Methodology

To study individual preferences for couple equity and beliefs about men's preferences, we designed the Couple Equity Survey. The survey was administered in six countries using a common sampling and survey methodology. The countries included in the study are Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the United States (US). The choice of countries is motivated by an interest in providing evidence from contexts that differ in maternal labor supply. Across the six countries, the share of mothers staying home or working part-time ranges from 22% in Sweden to 64% in Germany (Appendix Figure A.1).

In total, we surveyed 24,000 individuals across the six countries. The data were collected between August 2023 and March 2024. In each country, we surveyed a total of 4,000 respondents between the ages of 18 and 45 who do not have children.[8] The data collection was carried out in two waves. In the first wave (the 'baseline survey'), we surveyed 1,000 individuals in each country. We use these data as a basis for the information treatment embedded into the second wave, and to conduct several additional analyses. In the second wave (the 'main survey'), we collect survey responses from 3,000 individuals in each country. This wave contains the survey experiment, and we use these data for the main analyses. Respondents who participated in the baseline survey were not eligible to participate in the main survey. The average time to complete the main survey was 42 minutes, while the median time was 13 minutes.

The data collections were carried out in collaboration with the professional survey company *Pureprofile*, which is frequently used in social science research. Participants were members of the company's online panel or panels of vetted partner companies, and participated in the surveys online. Several attention checks and screening criteria were put in place to ensure high data quality (see Appendix B.1). Participants were paid modest incentives to participate in the study, and could receive bonus payments depending on their answers to specific survey questions. The surveys were scripted in Qualtrics, through which we also performed the randomization for the information experiment. The original surveys were

[8] We deliberately chose to survey respondents without children to limit concerns related to ex-post rationalization.

scripted in English. Translations into the official languages of the other countries were performed by the research team and a team of professional translators following state-of-the-art procedures (see Appendix B.2).

For each country and survey wave, we use a quota-based sampling approach to ensure that our samples are largely representative of the population of interest (i.e., adults without children between the ages of 18 and 45) in terms of gender, education, and region (see Appendix B.3). Appendix Table A.1 compares the characteristics of our samples to national population figures. Given our sampling procedure, our samples resemble the national population in terms of gender, education, and region. We also closely match other non-targeted characteristics such as age and marital status.

3 Study Design

In all six countries, we conduct a baseline survey and a main survey. The structure of the baseline and main survey is illustrated in Appendix Figures C.1 and C.2, respectively, and it is the same for all countries. The precise wording of the main survey questions can be found in Appendix C. The main purpose of the baseline survey is to obtain information on individual preferences for couple equity. We describe the elicitation method in Section 3.1. The information we obtain on men's preferences for couple equity forms the basis of our information treatment, which is embedded into the main survey and described in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, we describe the measures we take in the baseline and main survey to alleviate concerns related to social desirability bias and experimenter demand effects.

3.1 Baseline Survey: Eliciting Preferences for Couple Equity

We develop a new methodology to elicit individual preferences for couple equity. The elicitation approach allows us to obtain a measure of individual preferences that is inter-personally comparable. First, all respondents are asked to envision themselves in a (realistic) hypothetical future situation in which they are married and have a three-year-old child (henceforth, *1-child scenario*). Respondents are then confronted with a hypothetical decision situation

and they are asked to state *what they would personally prefer*:[9]

- **Option A:** Each partner works 35 hours per week and earns [35,000 €] gross per year. The total household income is [70,000 €] gross per year. Both partners equally take care of the child and household chores on weekdays and weekends.

- OR -

- **Option B:** The husband works 50 hours per week and earns [50,000 €] gross per year, whereas the wife works 20 hours per week and earns [20,000 €] gross per year. The total household income is [70,000 €] gross per year. On weekdays, the wife mainly takes care of the child and household chores, while on weekends the spouses share these tasks equally.

The salary figures in square brackets illustrate the decision environment for a German respondent. These figures are calculated for each country using a common methodology, and they broadly correspond to the pro-rata equivalent of the average salary of a full-time worker in each country (see Appendix B.4).

The two options that respondents are presented with broadly correspond to two types of time allocation: option A reflects 'couple equity', where by definition all tasks are split equally between couple members. Option B instead corresponds to a common way of dividing tasks within households, namely one where the male partner specializes in paid work and the female partner takes on more of the unpaid work responsibilities – or, in other words, the 'male breadwinner model'. Throughout the text, we refer to respondents who choose option A as respondents who have a preference for couple equity (over the male breadwinner model). The information treatment embedded into the main survey presents respondents with truthful information about the actual share of men in the baseline survey who state they prefer couple equity in this decision situation (see Section 3.2).

In the baseline survey, we further present respondents with a second version of this question, which is identical to the first question in all respects, except for the fact that respondents

[9] We use a combination of text and graphical illustrations to describe the decision situation. The complete wording and layout of the questions can be found in Appendix C.

are asked to envision a hypothetical future situation in which they have *two* children instead of one (henceforth, *2-child scenario)*. We use answers to these questions for the incentivization of post-treatment beliefs, which we elicit in our main survey to study belief updating in response to our treatment.

When designing these preference elicitation questions, we deliberately made several design choices. To highlight some of the design features, we ask all respondents to (i) envision themselves in a specific future situation (e.g., being married with one child), (ii) state what they would personally prefer (rather than what they intend to choose), and (iii) decide between two options (couple equity vs. male breadwinner model) that result in the same total gross household income (but not necessarily in the same total net household income). When interpreting the results of our study, it is important to keep these design features in mind. We made those design choices for several reasons. First, by presenting respondents with the same set of realistic hypothetical situations, we can fix certain aspects of the decision environment, which allows us to elicit individual preferences in choice environments we are particularly interested in.[10] Moreover, we deliberately chose to elicit individual preferences for couple equity rather than intended choices, as the goal of our study is to document men's preferences for couple equity, i.e. what they *personally* consider desirable. Preferences and choices may not coincide for a variety of different reasons - an issue we discuss in Section 6.

As mentioned above, the implied gross total household income is the same across the two options individuals are presented with. Whether or not total *net* household income is also the same across the two options depends on the country's taxation scheme. We use the OECD Tax-Benefit Web Calculator (OECD, 2023) to compute the net household income that would be foregone if a couple chooses the male breadwinner allocation in this benchmark scenario. The forgone income from choosing the male breadwinner allocation (as % of household income in the benchmark scenario) ranges between -0.18% for Germany and 1.58% for Italy (see Appendix B.4). While we cannot provide direct evidence on this

[10]We note that there might be respondents for whom this hypothetical future situation might not align with their own envisioned future. We added a disclosure statement at the beginning of this module, in which we acknowledge that the presented scenarios may not align with respondents' personal experiences or own envisioned future, and in which we nevertheless ask respondents to imagine themselves in the scenarios to the best of their ability. As we discuss in more detail below, our results are robust to restricting the analysis to individuals who are heterosexual or bisexual.

question, it is possible that the differences in actual preferences across countries may at least in part reflect those differences in taxation schemes. A further design choice we made is that the gross salary figures shown in the scenarios are proportional to hours worked. In practice, choosing couple equity may come at a cost if the returns to hours worked are convex. We relax the linearity assumption to allow for non-linear relationships between hours worked and earnings when we elicit individual willingness to pay for couple equity in the main survey.

Last but not least, in the main preference elicitation block described above we elicit individual preferences over two specific options (couple equity vs. male breadwinner model), in which we are very specific about the allocation of tasks, i.e., we do not elicit preferences about the full set of potential divisions of labor. This approach allows us to keep the decision environment simple. It facilitates the elicitation of beliefs and allows us to formulate the information treatment in a way that is easy to comprehend. In order to obtain supplementary evidence, we do consider one extension. More specifically, we also present all survey respondents in the baseline survey with two additional survey questions, one in which they have one child and one in which they have two children, and we ask them to decide between option A (couple equity) and option B, which is the same as above except for the fact that the roles are reversed (i.e., a female breadwinner model). We comment on this question in more detail in Section 6.3.

3.2 Main Survey: The Survey Experiment

In our main survey, we first elicit respondents' prior beliefs about the preferences of men in their country. We hypothesize that individuals systematically misperceive men's preferences for couple equity. Based on this hypothesis, we embed an information experiment in our main survey that has the goal of shifting individual beliefs about the preferences of men. We then collect information on posterior beliefs, and we elicit individuals' own preferences for couple equity and their willingness to pay for it. As we will show, men systematically underestimate the share of other men in their country who prefer couple equity. We therefore hypothesize that informing them about the actual share raises their own preference for couple equity and their willingness to pay for it. We further measure respondents' willingness to make an

incentivized donation to support an organization that promotes men's active involvement in household and caregiving responsibilities, and respondents' support for greater involvement of the government in promoting gender equality. The prediction for these outcome variables is less clear, and discussed in more detail below.

Prior beliefs To measure beliefs about the preferences of men, we ask all respondents to estimate what proportion of men in their country state they prefer couple equity over a male breadwinner model in the 1-child scenario described above. Before making their guesses, respondents are informed about the fact that the research team recently conducted a representative survey in their country, interviewing 1,000 childless adults aged between 18 and 45. It is explained that the study's objective was to obtain a better understanding of how men and women would personally prefer to divide different tasks within the household, and that the results 'represent the views and opinions of people' in their country. We then present the precise question that participants in the baseline survey had to answer (see Section 3.1 above), and ask respondents to indicate, out of 100 men we asked, how many they believe stated they prefer (A) an equal division of labor (i.e., couple equity), or (B) to focus on paid work (i.e., the male breadwinner model). To determine the extent to which individuals misperceive the preferences of men, we can compare participants' guesses about the proportion of men stating they prefer option A to the actual share of men in the baseline survey who stated they prefer option A. In order to induce careful responses, we incentivize this guess. Participants are told that the research team would randomly select one of the two bonus questions at the end of the study, and reward participants with a bonus if their guess exactly corresponds to the true value.[11]

Information treatment After eliciting respondents' prior beliefs about men's preferences for couple equity, we randomly assign survey participants to a treatment and control group (with 50% probability), and provide treated participants with truthful information about the actual share of men in their country who 'state they prefer an equal division of labor' in the 1-child scenario. The statistics for the information treatment are derived from our baseline

[11]The bonus amounts were 1 USD for the US, 1 EUR for Germany, Italy and Spain, 10 SEK for Sweden and 5 PLN for Poland.

survey data. To ensure that participants pay attention, we reveal the information piece by piece. Figure 1 illustrates the information that was shown to respondents in Germany. Control group respondents receive the same information, but only at the very end of the survey.

Figure 1: Illustration of information treatment (Germany)



Notes: The figure illustrates the information treatment as it was shown to German respondents.

In the five other countries, the actual share of men stating they prefer couple equity in the baseline survey is 71% in Italy, 56% in Poland, 84% in Spain, 72% in Sweden and 62% in the US (see Section 4.1 and Table 1 for more details). Equivalent graphical representations of these figures were used to illustrate the preferences of men in the other countries to treated respondents.

Posterior beliefs To examine whether our information intervention induced the expected shift in beliefs about the preferences of men, we ask respondents a second belief question, which is similar but not identical to the question we use to elicit prior beliefs. More precisely, we ask respondents to guess the number of male participants to our baseline survey, out of 100, who stated they prefer the couple equity option in a hypothetical situation in which

they have two young children instead of one (*2-child scenario*). Control group participants are asked the two belief questions one after the other, whereas treated respondents are asked the posterior belief question after viewing the information treatment screen. Posterior beliefs about the preferences of men are incentivized using the same reward scheme as for prior beliefs.[12] We can use this question to test for and detect belief revisions without repeating the question we use to elicit prior beliefs, thereby mitigating experimenter demand effects and consistency bias in survey responses (Haaland, Roth and Wohlfart, 2023).

Outcomes The information experiment allows us to assess whether providing respondents with truthful information about the preferences of men can shift individuals' own preferences. Our outcomes of interest, all of which were pre-registered, are:

- **Preferences for couple equity:** We elicit individual preferences for couple equity using the same question as in our baseline survey (1-child scenario, see Section 3.1 above). We construct a binary indicator that takes a value of one if the respondent chooses option A (couple equity) as their preferred allocation of tasks.

- **Willingness to pay for couple equity:** In addition, we develop a new elicitation method to obtain a quantitative, inter-personally comparable measure of individual willingness to pay (WTP) for couple equity. After presenting respondents with the hypothetical decision situation described above (1-child scenario), we present respondents with a series of additional questions, which are identical to the first one in all respects, except for the earnings of the husband (and thus total household income) in option B (highlighted in red below). By varying the husband's earnings in option B, we can make couple equity more (or less) costly. We use this elicitation approach to obtain an estimate of the total household income the individual is willing to forgo (or accept) in order to achieve couple equity. We illustrate this approach with an example. In Germany, respondents may be presented with the following additional question:

  - **Option A:** Each partner works 35 hours per week and earns [35,000 €] gross per

[12] Respondents are told that if this bonus question is randomly chosen they will receive a bonus if their response is correct.

year. The total household income is [70,000 €] gross per year. Both partners equally take care of the child and household chores on weekdays and weekends.

- OR -

– **Option B:** The husband works 50 hours per week and earns [54,000 €] gross per year, whereas the wife works 20 hours per week and earns [20,000 €] gross per year. The total household income is [74,000 €] gross per year. On weekdays, the wife mainly takes care of the child and household chores, while on weekends the spouses share these tasks equally.

In this example, if a respondent chooses option A when total gross household income is the same in the two options, but option B in this second decision situation, we can infer that the individual is not willing to forgo more than 4,000 € in total gross household income in order to achieve couple equity, and that the WTP for couple equity ranges between 0 € and 4,000 €. To minimize the number of questions, we use the staircase method to elicit individual WTP, and follow up with one additional multiple choice question in case the maximum node in the staircase is reached.[13] In Germany, for example, this elicitation approach allows us to obtain a measure of individual WTP in steps of 4,000 € in the interior section of the staircase. We compute WTP values as the mid-points of each 4,000 € interval. We note that the implied WTP can be negative if the individual is willing to pay to avoid couple equity. For the purpose of the analysis, we also construct a measure of *relative* WTP, which is the elicited WTP divided by total household income in the initial scenario, multiplied by 100. More details on the staircase method and how the values are calculated for each country can be found in Appendix B.5.

- **Incentivized donation:** As an additional post-treatment outcome, we measure respondents' willingness to donate money to an organization that promotes men's active involvement in household and caregiving responsibilities – *MenCare*.[14] More specif-

[13] See Falk et al. (2023) for applications of the staircase method to the elicitation of risk and time preferences.

[14] The charity's mission is to promote men's involvement as equitable fathers and caregivers in order to

ically, respondents are informed that they can decide how to divide a pre-specified amount (e.g., 80 € in Germany) between themselves and the charitable organization.[15] Moreover, they are informed that the research team will randomly select 10 respondents (from each country) for whom the decision will be a real decision. For the purpose of the analysis, we construct a variable which corresponds to the proportion of the total amount donated.

- **Policy preferences:** To study whether the treatment impacts policy preferences, we ask all participants whether they agree with the statement that their national government should do more to promote the involvement of fathers in the upbringing of their children. We construct a binary indicator which takes the value of one if a respondent agrees or strongly agrees with the statement, and zero otherwise.

Background characteristics We collect information on respondents' background characteristics such as their gender, age, educational attainment, marital status, and region of residence. We also obtain information on whether the respondent considers religion as important and whether the respondent's mother and father were working full-time, part-time, or not at all while they were young.

3.3 Social Desirability Bias and Experimenter Demand Effect

Social desirability bias (SDB) One concern that may arise when eliciting preferences for couple equity and beliefs about these preferences is that respondents may have felt that they had to respond in a specific, socially desirable way when being asked whether they prefer couple equity over the more traditional male breadwinner model. If this were the case, we may conflate misperceptions about individual preferences with SDB. We took several steps to address this concern. First, all participants are informed that the survey is anonymous

achieve family well-being, gender equality, and better health for mothers, fathers, and children. *MenCare* collaborates with partner organizations around the world to actively engage men in fatherhood, in caregiving, and in maternal, newborn, and child health. More information about *MenCare* can be found here.

[15] The pre-specified amounts were 80 € for Germany, 50 € for Italy, 100 PLN for Poland, 40 € for Spain, 700 SEK for Sweden and 100 USD for the US. Amounts are computed so that the ratio between the donation amount and the median yearly income is approximately the same across countries.

and no conclusion about their person can be drawn. Second, in our main survey, we explicitly elicit beliefs about the *stated* preferences of others, and, third, we incentivize these guesses. If participants distort their own answers, they should be able to anticipate that others do the same. Participants are incentivized to anticipate potential social desirability effects and to take them into account. Fourth, we follow the approach used in Bursztyn, González and Yanagizawa-Drott (2020) and conduct a 'list experiment' in our baseline survey to measure the level of agreement with the statement regarding whether women and men should be equally involved in the upbringing of their children. Survey participants are randomly assigned to a direct elicitation method or to a method that provides high 'cover' for their opinion on couple equity.[16] We find that providing respondents with a higher degree of plausible deniability results in a very similar level of agreement with the statement. The estimated difference in agreement rates between the two approaches is 0.002 (p-value = 0.934). Fifth, in our baseline survey we follow the experimental approach developed by Bursztyn et al. (2023) to test for the presence of SDB. More specifically, we randomize respondents in the baseline survey into two versions of the belief elicitation block.[17] In the 'Stated' version, respondents are asked how many out of 100 men in their country 'state that they prefer' an equal division of labor (option A) and how many 'state that they prefer' to focus on paid work (option B). In the 'Truthful' version, respondents are asked how many they think 'truly prefer' an equal division of labor (option A) and how many 'truly prefer' to focus on paid work (option B). By comparing individual perceptions between the 'Stated' and 'Truthful' conditions, we can infer whether participants anticipate that others distort their answers. In other words, if respondents distort their own answers they should also be able to anticipate that others do the same. Reassuringly, the answers to the two versions of the question are very similar. The estimated difference between the two conditions is 0.865 (p-value = 0.128), i.e., it is smaller than one percentage point. Overall, we conclude that SDB is unlikely to be a main driver of our results, which is consistent with results from a growing literature indicating that these types of misperceptions are indeed real (see

[16] See Appendix B.6 for more details.

[17] In order to ensure comparability across the two versions of the belief elicitation block in the baseline survey, we did not incentivize beliefs in the baseline survey wave.

Bursztyn and Yang 2022, for a recent survey and meta-analysis).

Mitigating Experimenter Demand Effects A primary obstacle in information experiments lies in distinguishing effects stemming from genuine shifts in beliefs versus those induced by priming or a desire to please the experimenter. Although existing empirical studies suggest that experimenter demand effects have limited quantitative importance in anonymous online surveys (De Quidt, Haushofer and Roth, 2018; Mummolo and Peterson, 2019), we nevertheless took several measures to address these concerns. As highlighted by Haaland, Roth and Wohlfart (2023), it is considered best practice to include measures to alleviate demand effects, as these may vary across contexts. First, we explicitly inform all participants that the survey guarantees anonymity, emphasizing that no inferences about their identity can be drawn. Second, in our main survey we elicit prior beliefs from the entire respondent pool, regardless of their treatment status, ensuring that all participants are primed to contemplate the focal issue. Third, we incentivize the elicitation of prior beliefs in the main survey by informing respondents that they can earn an additional bonus if their guess corresponds to the correct answer. This design choice has the advantage that, when the treated participants receive the information, it can be perceived as feedback on whether their response qualifies for the extra payment. Obfuscating information treatments by presenting them as feedback on correctness and eligibility for a bonus payment is considered one of the best practices in mitigating experimenter demand effects (Haaland, Roth and Wohlfart, 2023). Lastly, by eliciting incentivized posterior beliefs, we can demonstrate that participants in the treatment group are more inclined to revise their beliefs. At the same time, the elicitation of incentivized prior beliefs enables us to examine treatment effect heterogeneity based on prior beliefs about the preferences of men. Both of these results are frequently construed as indications that treatment effects arise from genuine changes in beliefs (Haaland, Roth and Wohlfart, 2023).

4 Preference (Mis)Perceptions

4.1 Actual and Perceived Preferences for Couple Equity

What share of men prefers couple equity over the more traditional male breadwinner model? And are the preferences of men systematically misperceived? Table 1 displays the actual and perceived preferences of men for couple equity. For each country, the first row presents the actual and perceived shares of men preferring couple equity in the scenario in which there is one child, whereas the second row displays the actual and perceived shares of men preferring couple equity when there are two children. The p-values for the equality test between the actual and perceived shares are displayed in parentheses below the perceived shares (two-sided t-test).

> *Result 1: In all six countries, the majority of men prefer couple equity, both in the scenario in which the couple has one child and the scenario in which the couple has two children. The actual share of men preferring couple equity varies considerably across countries.*

The actual share of men preferring couple equity in the scenario in which there is one child ranges from 56% (Poland) to 84% (Spain). These statistics are based on men's responses to the baseline survey and they form the basis of our information treatment, which we embed into the main survey. Of all possible pairwise country comparisons (15), 12 are significantly different at the 5-percent level (t-test). The share of men preferring couple equity when there are two children instead of one is somewhat lower in all six countries, but it is still higher than 50% in all countries in our sample. Again, we document substantial variation across countries, with the share ranging from 52% (Poland) to 80% (Spain).

> *Result 2: In all six countries, people systematically underestimate the actual share of men preferring couple equity, both in the scenario in which the couple has one child and the scenario in which the couple has two children. For both scenarios, respondents in all six countries on average believe that a minority of men prefer couple equity.*

Table 1: Actual and perceived preferences of men for couple equity

	Germany		Italy		Poland		Spain		Sweden		US	
	Act.	Perc.	Act.	Perc.	Act.	Perc.	Act.	Perc.	Act.	Perc.	Act.	Perc.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
1-child	73.8	42.1	70.8	43.1	56.4	40.1	83.9	48.3	72.5	46.8	62.4	41.5
		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)
2-child	64.7	38.0	70.1	39.4	52.1	38.1	79.9	45.0	68.1	43.7	55.8	37.1
		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)
Obs. (1)	572	3000	571	3000	560	3000	547	3000	570	3000	559	3000
Obs. (2)	572	1496	571	1492	560	1493	547	1509	570	1500	559	1490

Notes: This table displays the actual (column heading 'Act.') and perceived (column heading 'Perc.') shares of men preferring couple equity, separately for each country. Results are displayed for the 1-child scenario (first row) and 2-child scenario (second row). The actual shares are based on the responses of men to the baseline survey. The perceived shares for the 1-child scenario are computed using the answers of all respondents to the main survey, whereas the perceived shares for the 2-child scenario are computed using only control group respondents from the main survey. The p-values for the equality test between the actual and perceived shares are displayed in parentheses below the perceived shares (two-sided t-test).

In all six countries, the average perceived share of men preferring couple equity is estimated to be significantly lower than the actual share, both in the 1-child as well as in the 2-child scenario. All comparisons are statistically significant at the 1% level. In the 1-child scenario, the perceived share ranges between 40% (Poland) and 48% (Spain). Consistent with the actual shares being somewhat lower when there are two children instead of one, we also document that the average perceived shares are somewhat lower in the 2-child scenario. For the scenario in which there are two children, the perceived share ranges between 38% (Germany) and 45% (Spain).[18] The implied average perception gaps are sizable in all six countries. For the 1-child scenario, perception gaps range between 16 percentage points (Poland) and 36 percentage points (Spain). Across all six countries, the average perception gap is estimated to be 26 percentage points. For the 2-child scenario, the estimated average perception gap ranges between 14 percentage points (Poland) and 35 percentage points (Spain), with an average perception gap of 25 percentage points estimated across all six countries. At the country level, we document strong positive correlations between the average perceived shares and the actual shares, both for the 1-child scenario ($\rho = 0.85$, p-value=0.033) as well as the 2-child scenario ($\rho = 0.81$, p-value=0.051).

[18]The perceived shares for the 2-child scenario are computed using only control group respondents from the main survey, as this question was asked after the treatment.

Result 3: Both male and female respondents systematically underestimate the share of men preferring couple equity in their country. The average misperceptions are larger for women than they are for men.

Appendix Table A.2 presents the perceived and actual shares for both scenarios, separately for male and female respondents. For both scenarios, we find that both men and women significantly underestimate the share of men preferring couple equity. In all six countries, the differences between the perceived and actual shares are highly statistically significant at the 1% level. Moreover, we find that in all six countries the average perception gaps are significantly larger (in absolute terms) for women than they are for men (p-value < 0.001).

Figure 2 graphically illustrates the perception gaps for the 1-child scenario. Panel A shows the results for male respondents, whereas panel B presents the results for female respondents.[19] The graphs plot the average perceived share of men preferring couple equity in the 1-child scenario against the actual share in each country. Points below the 45-degree line indicate that on average respondents underestimate the actual share. This figure illustrates some of our key results. First, both male and female respondents substantially underestimate the actual share of men preferring couple equity in all six countries. In Germany, for example, male respondents believe that 44% of men prefer couple equity and female respondents perceive the share to be 41%, while in fact the actual share is 74%. Second, female respondents on average underestimate the actual share of men preferring couple equity by more. Third, we note that for both male and female respondents, we find strong positive correlations between the actual and perceived shares of men preferring couple equity at the country level. For male respondents the correlation is $\rho = 0.86$ (p-value=0.030), whereas for female respondents it is $\rho = 0.71$ (p-value=0.112).

Taken together, the majority of men in all six countries prefer couple equity (in both scenarios), but respondents on average believe that a minority of men prefer this division of labor within the household. These perception gaps are prevalent among both female and male respondents. Both women and men on average believe that men in their country hold less progressive attitudes than they actually do.

[19] See Appendix Figure A.2 for a similar figure using the pooled sample of respondents

Figure 2: Actual and perceived shares of men preferring couple equity

(a) Male respondents



(b) Female respondents



Notes: This figure plots the average perceived share of men preferring couple equity (when there is one child) in each country against the actual share, separately for male and female respondents. The actual shares are computed using the baseline survey; the perceived shares are computed using the main survey (all observations: control and treatment). The area is partitioned by the 45-degree line into segments representing overestimators (above) and underestimators (below) of the actual share of men preferring couple equity. The graphs display the correlation between the perceived and actual shares, as well as the corresponding p-values in parentheses.

4.2 Heterogeneity in Perceptions

Individuals differ considerably in their beliefs about men's preferences for couple equity. We explore this heterogeneity, and how it is related to own preferences for couple equity, in more detail in this section.

> *Result 4: There is a considerable degree of heterogeneity in beliefs about men's preferences. Beliefs about the preferences of men significantly predict own preferences for couple equity. The estimated association between beliefs and own preferences is greater for male than for female respondents.*

Figure 3 displays the empirical cumulative distribution function of the prediction error

(individual guess minus actual share), separately for each country.[20] The fraction of respondents strictly underestimating the actual share is 91% in Germany, 90% in Italy, 78% in Poland, 93% in Spain, 84% in Sweden, and 82% in the US. The prediction error, which captures individual-level accuracy, is sizable for a substantial proportion of respondents. For example, in the United States, 48% of respondents underestimate the actual share by more than 25 percentage points. In Spain, which is the country with the highest actual share, 34% of respondents underestimate the true share by more than 50 percentage points. In Appendix Table A.3, we explore which individual-level characteristics predict the absolute prediction error (column 1). We find significantly smaller absolute misperceptions for male respondents and respondents whose own mothers worked part-time or full-time during their childhood (relative to staying home). We find no significant association with whether the own father worked part-time or full-time. These results are robust to restricting the sample to underestimators (Appendix Table A.3, column 2).

Figure 3: Accuracy of individual beliefs about men's preferences



Notes: This figure plots the empirical cumulative distribution function of the prediction error (individual guess minus the actual share of men preferring couple equity), separately for each country.

[20] Appendix Figure A.3 also displays the distribution of beliefs about men's preferences for couple equity, separately for each country.

Next, we explore whether beliefs about the preferences of men predict own preferences for couple equity. In a univariate linear regression, a one-percentage-point increase in the perceived proportion of men preferring couple equity is associated with a 0.43-percentage point (p-value< 0.001) increase in respondents' own preferences for couple equity (see Table 2).[21] For male respondents, a one-percentage-point increase in beliefs is associated with a 0.72-percentage point (p-value< 0.001) increase in own preferences for couple equity, whereas for female respondents the estimated coefficient is 0.13 (p-value< 0.001). We can reject the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficients for male and female respondents are the same at the 1% level. These results are robust to the inclusion of a rich set of individual control variables as well as country-region fixed effects.

Table 2: Preferences for couple equity and beliefs about men's preferences

	Dependent variable: Preference for couple equity (binary)					
	Full Sample		Male Respondents		Female Respondents	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Beliefs about men's preferences	0.434***	0.430***	0.719***	0.654***	0.129***	0.129***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.051)	(0.046)	(0.028)	(0.013)
Individual controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Country-region FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	8980	8980	4799	4799	4181	4181
R^2	.04	.108	.109	.158	.003	.075

Notes: This table presents the results of OLS regressions in which we regress a binary indicator for preferring couple equity (over the male breadwinner model) in the 1-child scenario on individual beliefs about the share of men preferring couple equity in this scenario (0-1). The results are presented for the full sample (columns 1 and 2), as well as for male (columns 3 and 4) and female respondents (columns 5 and 6). In each panel, the first column presents the regression results without controls, whereas the second column includes individual controls and country-region fixed effects. The individual characteristics we control for are gender, age, parental employment status during the respondents' childhood (we include four separate dummy variables for full-time and part-time employment of the fathers and mothers), importance of religion, university degree attainment, and marital status. Country-region fixed effects correspond to NUTS2 regions in EU countries and states in the US. Only untreated respondents from the main survey are used in all of these analyses. R^2 refers to the adjusted-R^2. Standard errors are clustered at the country level and displayed in parenthesis: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Taken together, we document pluralistic ignorance about the preferences of men with regard to couple equity, which is large and systematic in all six countries. Men's preferences for couple equity are systematically misperceived by both men and women. At the same time, beliefs about the preferences of men strongly predict respondents' own preferences for cou-

[21] The analysis reported in this table uses untreated respondents from the main survey only, as the couple equity preferences were elicited after the treatment.

ple equity, especially for men. These descriptive results are consistent with identity-related considerations being important in determining men's preferences for an equitable division of tasks within the household. The fact that men's preferences for couple equity are systematically misperceived can constitute an obstacle to gender equality. Systematic misperceptions of prevalent preferences or values can trap individuals in an equilibrium with traditional gender roles: Individuals may choose the traditional male breadwinner model because they misperceive the prevalent preferences of men in their country, further hindering progress towards gender equality and enforcing prevalent misperceptions. In such an equilibrium, correcting beliefs holds substantial potential. Whether or not there is a causal relationship between beliefs and own preferences, and whether an information treatment can shift beliefs and preferences for couple equity, is a question we explore in the next section.

5 Randomized Information Experiment

In this section, we explore whether providing individuals with truthful information about the actual share of men preferring couple equity in their country can shift individual beliefs and preferences for couple equity. To study this question, we embed an information experiment into the main survey. After eliciting respondents' prior beliefs about the share of men preferring couple equity in their country (in the 1-child scenario), treated respondents are informed about the actual share of men in their country preferring couple equity. The actual shares, which are derived from men's responses to the baseline survey, are 74% in Germany, 71% in Italy, 56% in Poland, 84% in Spain, 72% in Sweden, and 62% in the US. This information is provided to treated respondents before we elicit posterior beliefs and the other outcomes of interest. Respondents randomized into the control group receive the same information, but only at the very end of the survey. Appendix Table A.4 presents the balancing of characteristics across the two groups, separately for each country. In all countries, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the average characteristics are the same and conclude that the randomizations were successful.

5.1 Empirical Specification

The empirical strategy was specified in a preanalysis plan that was registered at the AEA Registry before we collected and analyzed the data.[22] We estimate the effect of the information treatment on our outcomes of interest using the following empirical specification, which we estimate separately for each country:

$$y_{ic} = \alpha_c + \beta_c T_{ic} + X'_{ic}\gamma_c + \varepsilon_{ic}, \tag{1}$$

where y_{ic} is the outcome of interest for respondent i in country c, T_{ic} is the binary treatment indicator, and X_{ic} is a vector of characteristics for respondent i in country c. The estimated $\hat{\beta}_c$ is the average treatment effect for country c. We first estimate treatment effects on posterior beliefs to study belief updating. We then estimate treatment effects on the other outcomes of interest. Our primary outcomes of interest are respondents' own preferences and WTP for couple equity. Secondary outcomes include the incentivized donation decision and policy preferences. The pre-specified set of control variables in X_{ic} includes gender, age, having a university degree, being married/in a stable relationship, considering religion as important, four separate indicators for the mother/father working full-time/part-time when the respondent was young, and country-specific region fixed effects. In Appendix A, we show that our results are robust to excluding the covariates from the regressions.

In addition, we conduct two pre-specified heterogeneity analyses. More specifically, we estimate the following specification to explore treatment effect heterogeneity by prior, i.e., by whether the respondent over- or underestimates the actual share of men preferring couple equity:

$$y_{ic} = \alpha_{1c} U_{ic} + \alpha_{2c} O_{ic} + \beta_{1c} T_{ic} \times U_{ic} + \beta_{2c} T_{ic} \times O_{ic} + X'_{ic}\gamma_c + \varepsilon_{ic}, \tag{2}$$

where U_{ic} is an indicator variable which equals 1 if respondent i in country c strictly underestimates the actual share of men preferring couple equity in their country, and O_{ic} is an indicator variable which equals 1 if the respondent holds correct beliefs or overestimates the actual share. $\hat{\beta}_{1c}$ and $\hat{\beta}_{2c}$ are the estimated average treatment effects for under- and

[22] See https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/12817 and https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/12926.

overestimators, respectively. The estimated coefficients $\hat{\alpha}_{1c}$ and $\hat{\alpha}_{2c}$ correspond to the average outcomes of the two subgroups in the control group. Analogously, we estimate the following specification to explore treatment effect heterogeneity by gender:

$$y_{ic} = \alpha_{1c}F_{ic} + \alpha_{2c}M_{ic} + \beta_{1c}T_{ic} \times F_{ic} + \beta_{2c}T_{ic} \times M_{ic} + X'_{ic}\gamma_c + \varepsilon_{ic}, \tag{3}$$

where F_{ic} and M_{ic} are indicators for being female and male, respectively.

Finally, we conduct the same analyses described above pooling all countries.[23] In the pooled regressions, we control for country-region fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the country level.

5.2 First Stage: Treatment Effects on Posterior Beliefs

We first conduct a manipulation check and explore whether the information provided shifts individual beliefs in the expected direction. For this purpose, we use individual responses to the question, which elicits beliefs about the preferences of men in the 2-child scenario. Given that respondents on average underestimate the share of men preferring couple equity in their country, we expect posterior beliefs to be shifted upwards by the information treatment.

The results in panel A of Table 3 are in line with that prediction. In all six countries, the treatment has a positive and statistically significant impact on posterior beliefs.[24] The estimated treatment effects are sizable. In Spain, for example, which is the country with the largest average misperceptions, the treatment closes the perception gap by 25 percentage points (or 71%). In the pooled sample, the perception gap is narrowed by 19 percentage points (or 76%). In all six countries, the estimated impact on posterior beliefs is somewhat smaller than the average perception gap documented in the control group, suggesting that not all treated respondents update their beliefs (fully). Since respondents in the different countries learn about statistics of varying magnitudes, a direct comparison of treatment effects across countries is not meaningful. We note, however, that in countries in which misperceptions are larger (in absolute terms), the estimated impact of the information treatment

[23] We note that this analysis was not pre-registered in our pre-analysis plan.

[24] Appendix Table A.5 shows that the results are robust to the exclusion of all control variables from the regressions.

Table 3: Treatment effects on posterior beliefs

	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	Sweden	US	Pooled
Panel A: Treatment effect							
Treatment	0.204***	0.213***	0.113***	0.245***	0.183***	0.161***	0.187***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.019)
Control mean	0.380	0.394	0.381	0.450	0.437	0.371	0.402
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	18000
Panel B: Treatment effect heterogeneity by prior beliefs							
	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	Sweden	US	Pooled
Treat. x Underest.	0.220***	0.241***	0.169***	0.268***	0.218***	0.196***	0.221***
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.014)
Treat. x Overest.	0.012	-0.055***	-0.068***	-0.054**	-0.022*	0.010	-0.029
	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.011)	(0.023)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Underestimator	0.435***	0.450***	0.367***	0.479***	0.389***	0.350***	0.397***
	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.017)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.014)
Overestimator	0.750***	0.797***	0.655***	0.890***	0.726***	0.626***	0.720***
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.020)	(0.032)	(0.025)	(0.031)	(0.018)
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	18000
Panel C: Treatment effect heterogeneity by gender							
	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	Sweden	US	Pooled
Treat. x Male	0.186***	0.184***	0.096***	0.213***	0.160***	0.155***	0.167***
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.016)
Treat. x Female	0.226***	0.250***	0.130***	0.284***	0.206***	0.169***	0.210***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.023)
Male	0.470***	0.525***	0.434***	0.534***	0.441***	0.405***	0.446***
	(0.023)	(0.031)	(0.020)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.013)
Female	0.412***	0.444***	0.383***	0.424***	0.376***	0.384***	0.381***
	(0.023)	(0.031)	(0.019)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.018)
p-value	0.005	0.000	0.006	0.000	0.001	0.330	0.004
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	18000

Notes: This table shows OLS regression estimates using all respondents from the main survey, separately for each country as well as for the pooled sample. The dependent variable in all regressions is the perceived share of men preferring couple equity in the 2-child scenario (0-1). The p-values refer to tests for the equality of the following coefficients: 'Treat. x Underest.' versus 'Treat. x Overest.' (panel B), and 'Treat. x Male' versus 'Treat. x Female' (panel C). All regressions include controls for gender, age, having a university degree, being married or in a stable relationship (indicator), the mother/father working full-time/part-time (four indicators), considering religion as important, and country-region fixed effects. We report robust standard errors in parentheses in the country regressions, and clustered standard errors (at the country level) in the pooled regressions. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

also tends to be greater.

> *Result 5: In all six countries, we estimate positive average treatment effects on posterior beliefs. The estimated impacts are significantly greater for individuals who underestimated the actual share.*

The results presented in panel B shed light on the question whether treatment effects are heterogeneous with respect to respondents' priors. In all six countries, we estimate significantly positive treatment effects on posterior beliefs for respondents whose priors lie below the actual shares. In four of the six countries, we estimate significantly negative treatment effects on posterior beliefs for respondents we classify as 'overestimators'. In the remaining two countries, we do not detect a significant impact on posterior beliefs for this group of individuals. For all six countries as well as for the pooled sample, we can reject the null hypothesis that the estimated treatment effects are the same for under- and overestimators at the 1% level.

In panel C, we explore whether treatment effects are heterogeneous with respect to the gender of the respondent. As a result of the information treatment, both male and female respondents on average report significantly higher posterior beliefs. The estimated treatment effects are significantly greater for female respondents in five out of six countries as well as in the pooled sample. This result is in line with the finding that women have larger misperceptions in their priors.

Overall, our information treatment induced substantial belief updating, especially for groups of respondents whose prior beliefs were more distant from actual figures.

5.3 Treatment Effects on Preferences for Couple Equity

Does providing individuals with truthful information about the preferences of men in their country only lead to a significant shift in beliefs, or does this information also affect individuals' own preferences for couple equity? If identity-related considerations play a role, we would expect men's own preferences for couple equity to be shifted by the information provided. To study this question, we regress a binary indicator, which equals one if the

respondent prefers couple equity in the 1-child scenario, on the treatment indicator as well as the same set of control variables as above. The results for the full sample as well as for the different subgroups are displayed in Table 4.

> *Result 6: The treatment effect on individuals' own preferences for couple equity is estimated to be positive, and it is significant in five out of six countries as well as in the pooled sample. The positive treatment effects are primarily driven by underestimators and male respondents.*

As can be seen in panel A, the information treatment has a significant positive effect on respondents' own preferences for couple equity: in five out of six countries, treated participants are significantly more likely to prefer couple equity over the more traditional male breadwinner model. In Spain, for example, treated respondents are 3.3 percentage points more likely to choose the couple equity option (p-value = 0.012). In the pooled sample, the treatment effect is estimated to be 3.7 percentage points (p-value < 0.001), which constitutes a 5.3% increase over the control group mean.

Panels B and C present the heterogeneity analyses by prior and gender, respectively. These analyses allow us to shed light on whose preferences exhibit the largest response to the information treatment. Panel B reveals that in all countries, our treatment effects are primarily driven by those respondents who initially underestimated the actual share of men preferring couple equity. We note, however, that in all countries except Spain we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the treatment had the same effect on under- and overestimators. In the pooled sample, we can reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level.

As can be seen in panel C, our results are mainly driven by male respondents. For men, the estimated treatment effect is positive and significant in five out of the six countries, whereas for women it is only significant in one of the countries. We note, however, that in all six countries we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the estimated treatment effects are equal. Pooling the data from all six countries, we do reject the null hypothesis that the estimated treatment effect is the same for both genders at the 1% level. For men, we estimate an impact of 5.2 percentage points, which constitutes a 9.0% increase over the control group mean, whereas for women we estimate an impact of 2.0 percentage points.

The fact that men's preferences seem to have responded more to the information treatment is consistent with the finding that beliefs about men's preferences for couple equity are more strongly associated with men's own preferences than women's (see Table 2). Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that women also respond to this information, albeit to a smaller extent. It suggests that beliefs about the preferences of the other gender can also influence individual preferences for couple equity. Using data from control group respondents, a further pattern we document is that the share of women preferring couple equity is greater than the share of men who prefer it (see panel C).[25] Despite this fact, we note that a non-trivial proportion of control group women prefers the male breadwinner model over the equitable division of tasks. The share ranges between 15% (Spain) and 36% (US).

Appendix Table A.6 presents results from similar regressions where we additionally include prior beliefs about the preferences of men to the set of control variables. Our results are robust to the inclusion of this additional control variable. Appendix Table A.7 shows that the results are also robust to the exclusion of all control variables. Appendix Table A.8 further demonstrates that our results are quantitatively and qualitatively very similar if we restrict the sample to heterosexual or bisexual individuals, for whom the hypothetical situation we ask respondents to imagine is more realistic. In fact, we note that the estimated average treatment effect for the United States is significant at the 10% level in this specification, and estimated to be 3.4 percentage points.

5.4 Treatment Effects on WTP for Couple Equity

In the main survey, we do not only elicit preferences for couple equity when the choice is between two options with identical total gross household income. Using the staircase method, we also elicit respondents' willingness to pay for couple equity, i.e., the amount of gross household income respondents are willing to forgo in order to achieve (or avoid) couple equity. The advantage of our WTP measure is that it is continuous, which allows us to explore more granular variation in preferences for couple equity. The WTP elicitation method further allows us to capture the fundamental trade-off that couple equity may come

[25] We note that the gender differences are statistically significant at the 5% level in 4 out of 6 countries.

Table 4: Treatment effects on preferences for couple equity

	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	Sweden	US	Pooled
Panel A: Treatment effect							
Treatment	0.056***	0.035**	0.041**	0.033**	0.031**	0.025	0.037***
	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.005)
Control mean	0.652	0.761	0.614	0.820	0.746	0.603	0.700
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	18000
Panel B: Treatment effect heterogeneity by prior beliefs							
Treat. x Underest.	0.053***	0.039**	0.054***	0.041***	0.033*	0.026	0.041***
	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.005)
Treat. x Overest.	0.064	-0.004	0.014	-0.069*	0.006	0.028	0.011
	(0.048)	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.029)	(0.040)	(0.010)
Underestimator	0.566***	0.851***	0.611***	0.772***	0.559***	0.662***	0.573***
	(0.054)	(0.068)	(0.054)	(0.048)	(0.065)	(0.078)	(0.027)
Overestimator	0.699***	0.987***	0.823***	0.939***	0.710***	0.779***	0.731***
	(0.064)	(0.070)	(0.058)	(0.050)	(0.068)	(0.081)	(0.035)
p-value	0.826	0.314	0.302	0.006	0.417	0.963	0.035
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	18000
Panel C: Treatment effect heterogeneity by gender							
Treat. x Male	0.063***	0.053**	0.053**	0.052***	0.035	0.054**	0.052***
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.004)
Treat. x Female	0.048**	0.012	0.029	0.012	0.026	-0.010	0.020*
	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.008)
Male	0.572***	0.866***	0.647***	0.781***	0.566***	0.672***	0.581***
	(0.055)	(0.069)	(0.056)	(0.049)	(0.066)	(0.079)	(0.030)
Female	0.617***	0.937***	0.826***	0.824***	0.592***	0.750***	0.653***
	(0.055)	(0.068)	(0.051)	(0.046)	(0.064)	(0.079)	(0.046)
p-value	0.639	0.168	0.485	0.130	0.753	0.072	0.010
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	18000

Notes: This table shows OLS regression estimates using all respondents from the main survey, separately for each country as well as for the pooled sample. The dependent variable in all regressions is a binary indicator for preferring couple equity in the 1-child scenario. The p-values refer to tests for the equality of the following coefficients: 'Treat. x Underest.' versus 'Treat. x Overest.' (panel B), and 'Treat. x Male' versus 'Treat. x Female' (panel C). All regressions include controls for gender, age, having a university degree, being married or in a stable relationship (indicator), the mother/father working full-time/part-time (four indicators), considering religion as important, and country-region fixed effects. We report robust standard errors in parentheses in the country regressions, and clustered standard errors (at the country level) in the pooled regressions. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5: Treatment effects on relative WTP for couple equity

	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	Sweden	US	Pooled
Panel A: Treatment effect							
Treatment	7.518***	6.064***	3.468**	5.985***	4.421***	1.285	4.807***
	(1.748)	(1.622)	(1.606)	(1.729)	(1.687)	(1.698)	(0.896)
Control mean	21.663	32.054	17.036	41.195	27.872	14.196	25.701
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	18000
Panel B: Treatment effect heterogeneity by prior beliefs							
	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	Sweden	US	Pooled
Treat. x Underest.	6.436***	6.543***	5.516***	6.748***	5.403***	1.834	5.471***
	(1.815)	(1.714)	(1.783)	(1.785)	(1.837)	(1.851)	(0.710)
Treat. x Overest.	16.479***	1.024	-2.486	-3.899	-1.812	-0.693	0.596
	(6.208)	(4.827)	(3.494)	(6.596)	(4.158)	(4.164)	(2.273)
Underestimator	5.868	36.554***	15.750***	12.084**	-9.756	27.341***	7.037
	(5.569)	(7.280)	(5.265)	(5.966)	(7.097)	(9.089)	(6.526)
Overestimator	14.131*	51.115***	33.531***	31.346***	5.136	37.120***	21.539**
	(7.268)	(7.861)	(5.799)	(7.316)	(7.606)	(9.417)	(6.222)
p-value	0.121	0.281	0.042	0.119	0.112	0.579	0.074
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	18000
Panel C: Treatment effect heterogeneity by gender							
	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	Sweden	US	Pooled
Treat. x Male	6.163***	7.205***	3.951*	5.719**	5.207**	2.077	5.108***
	(2.275)	(2.105)	(2.190)	(2.383)	(2.218)	(2.302)	(0.769)
Treat. x Female	9.119***	4.546*	2.975	6.297**	3.619	0.341	4.462**
	(2.719)	(2.532)	(2.360)	(2.519)	(2.550)	(2.506)	(1.207)
Male	7.121	38.536***	19.026***	14.106**	-8.672	28.849***	8.434
	(5.633)	(7.356)	(5.400)	(5.979)	(7.120)	(9.144)	(6.551)
Female	10.358*	46.870***	37.179***	19.054***	1.059	31.004***	15.995*
	(5.777)	(7.429)	(5.078)	(5.893)	(7.090)	(9.052)	(7.170)
p-value	0.406	0.419	0.762	0.868	0.638	0.609	0.499
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	18000

Notes: This table shows OLS regression estimates using all respondents from the main survey, separately for each country as well as for the pooled sample. The dependent variable in all regressions is the relative WTP for couple equity in the 1-child scenario. The p-values refer to tests for the equality of the following coefficients: 'Treat. x Underest.' versus 'Treat. x Overest.' (panel B), and 'Treat. x Male' versus 'Treat. x Female' (panel C). All regressions include controls for gender, age, having a university degree, being married or in a stable relationship (indicator), the mother/father working full-time/part-time (four indicators), considering religion as important, and country-region fixed effects. We report robust standard errors in parentheses in the country regressions, and clustered standard errors (at the country level) in the pooled regressions. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

at a (monetary) cost.

> *Result 7: There is substantial heterogeneity in individual WTP to achieve (or avoid) couple equity, both across as well as within countries. In all six countries, individuals are on average willing to pay positive amounts to achieve couple equity. We estimate positive and significant treatment effects on individual WTP in five out of six countries, as well as in the pooled sample.*

We start by providing descriptive evidence on respondents' WTP for couple equity. Using respondents from the control group, we calculate each individual's WTP as well as key statistics from the country-level distributions of WTP. The distributions of respondents' WTP are depicted in Appendix Figure A.4, separately for each country. Panel A of Appendix Table A.9 provides information on the mean, median, and other percentiles of the WTP distributions. Across all six countries, there is large heterogeneity in WTP for couple equity, with a substantial proportion of individuals willing to pay substantial amounts in order to achieve (or avoid) couple equity. The average WTP is positive in all six countries in our sample, and corresponds to 22% of the benchmark household income in Germany, 32% in Italy, 17% in Poland, 41% in Spain, 28% in Sweden, and 14% in the US.

To illustrate the variation, we present more detailed statistics on the US and Spain, which are the countries with the lowest and highest relative WTP, respectively. In the US, respondents are on average willing to sacrifice $12,600 in household income to achieve couple equity (or 14% of the $90,000 considered as the benchmark in the initial scenario). The median respondent is willing to sacrifice only $2,700 (or 3% of the benchmark household income). About 25% of respondents would be willing to pay more than $27,000 (or 30%) to achieve couple equity. At the same time, a non-trivial share of respondents is willing to pay substantial amounts to *avoid* couple equity. For example, 10% of respondents in the US are willing to pay more than $32,400 (or 36%) in household income in order to implement the male breadwinner model. In Spain, on the other hand, respondents are on average willing to forgo 16,400€ (or 41%) of household income to achieve couple equity. The median respondent is willing to pay 11,200€ (or 28%).

These numbers mask some heterogeneity by gender. In Panels B and C of Table A.9,

we can observe that, perhaps unsurprisingly, women are on average willing to pay more to achieve couple equity than men. The average WTP of women corresponds to 24% of the benchmark household income in Germany, 36% in Italy, 27% in Poland, 44% in Spain, 32% in Sweden and 15% in the United States. For men, their average WTP corresponds to 20% of the benchmark household income in Germany, 29% in Italy, 7% in Poland, 39% in Spain, 24% in Sweden, and 13% in the United States.

We now analyze if our information treatment has any effect on respondents' relative WTP for couple equity. The results are displayed in Table 5.[26] Panel A shows that our information treatment has a positive and significant effect on respondents' willingness to pay for couple equity in all countries except the US. In Germany, for example the estimated coefficient is 7.5 percentage points (p-value < 0.001), which corresponds to a 35% increase over the control group mean. In monetary terms, this treatment effect equates to an increase in WTP of 5,260€. In the pooled sample, we estimate an average treatment effect of 4.8 percentage points (p-value $=$ 0.003).

Panel B presents the estimated treatment effects by priors. We can observe that the positive treatment effects that we document for the full sample are primarily driven by those respondents whose priors are below the actual value. For respondents whose priors are equal to or above the actual values, the estimated coefficients are mostly small and not significantly different from zero, except for Germany. In the pooled sample, we can reject the null hypothesis that the treatment effects are the same for over- and underestimators at the 10% level. While we cannot reject this null hypothesis in all countries, we still interpret our results as consistent with the hypothesis that changes in beliefs that correct misperceptions about men's preferences drive changes in one's own stated WTP for couple equity.

As for treatment heterogeneity by gender, panel C shows that in most countries the point estimates are larger for men than for women. We note, however, that these differences are not statistically significant, neither in the respective country samples nor in the pooled sample.

[26] All results remain quantitatively very similar when excluding all controls from the regressions, as shown in Appendix Table A.10, or when we account for the right-censoring of the WTP measure using Tobit regressions, as shown in Appendix Table A.11.

5.5 Treatment Effects on Donations and Policy Support

In this section, we estimate the impact of our information treatment on two additional outcomes: the incentivized donation to *MenCare* and individual support for governmental action to promote the involvement of fathers in the upbringing of their children. We note that, *ex-ante*, it is unclear whether we would expect the information treatment to impact those outcomes. On the one hand, learning about the fact that a high fraction of men prefer an equal division of tasks within the household could positively influence respondents' support for charities or public policies aimed at promoting their involvement in the upbringing of their children. On the other hand, the information may also decrease the support for such charities or policies as individuals may view them as less necessary.

Appendix Table A.12 reveals that the information treatment had no significant impact on individual donations to *MenCare* in five out of six countries as well as in the pooled sample. In Germany, being informed about the true share of men preferring couple equity significantly raises donations by 2.9 percentage points from a control group baseline of 42%. In monetary terms, this corresponds to an increase of 2.3€ for an allocated budget of 80€. This small but significant treatment effect seems to be primarily driven by men and those who initially underestimated men's preferences for couple equity. The results in Appendix Table A.13 reveal that the information treatment did not significantly affect the share of respondents agreeing with the statement that the national government should do more to promote the involvement of fathers in the upbringing of their children.

Overall our result suggests that, while providing information on men's preferences for couple equity can effectively influence individuals' own preferences and WTP for couple equity, this may not directly translate into increased support for external initiatives aimed at fostering gender equality in caregiving roles.

6 Supplementary Analyses

6.1 Beliefs, Misperceptions, and Gender Equality

Our survey data reveals large and widespread misperceptions about the preferences of men with regard to couple equity. Are the actual preferences of men and the misperceptions thereof systematically related to how gender equal a society is? To answer this question, we explore the cross-country patterns in more detail. Panel A of Figure 4 plots the percentage of men preferring couple equity in any given country against the 'Gender Equality Index'.[27] As one would expect, there is a strong positive correlation between the share of men preferring couple equity and gender equality at the country level ($\rho = 0.61$). Panel B of Figure 4 plots the average misperceptions about men's preferences against the same measure of gender equality. Perhaps surprisingly, average misperceptions tend to be larger (in absolute terms) the more gender equal a society is ($\rho = -0.53$).

Figure 4: Gender equality, men's preferences for couple equity and misperceptions thereof

(a) Men's preferences and gender equality

(b) Misperceptions and gender equality

Notes: This figure plots the percentage of men preferring couple equity (panel A) as well as the average misperceptions about men's preferences (panel B) against the 'Gender Equality Index', which is constructed based on UN data from 2022.

[27] This index is constructed from the 'Gender Inequality Index', based on data provided by the United Nations. The 'Gender Inequality Index' is a composite metric of gender inequality capturing three dimensions of inequality: reproductive health, empowerment, and the labor market. Following Falk and Hermle (2018), we inverted the values to create an index of gender equality (inverted index = 1 - index). We use data from 2022.

An important question which emerges is why beliefs about men's preferences are so far from actual preferences, especially in countries which are more gender equal. While we cannot provide a conclusive answer to this question, it is possible that a cultural lag phenomenon is at play in the formation of beliefs, such that actual gender norms evolve and change rapidly, while perceptions about these norms tend to remain fixed for a longer period of time (Ogburn, 1957). Recent literature has documented that social norms are misperceived in various settings where they are in a phase of (rapid) transition (see, e.g., Bursztyn, González and Yanagizawa-Drott, 2020; Andre et al., 2024*a*,*b*). In the context of gender equality, the growing debate around this issue is likely to have shifted actual preferences and opinions in a progressive direction. However, beliefs about these preferences may not have fully updated yet, especially if individuals do not frequently discuss issues related to fathers' labor supply with their peers. This is a question that we turn to in the next section.

6.2 Misperceptions and Frequency of Discussion

Next, we exploit a question in our survey that asks respondents how often they discuss issues related to fathers reducing their work hours when they have young children with their male friends and relatives. The distribution of answers to this question can be found in Appendix Figure A.5, separately for men and women. The majority (52%) of respondents report discussing such topics with their male friends and relatives either rarely or very rarely. To gauge if the frequency at which this topic is discussed is associated with individual misperceptions, we regress the absolute prediction error on individual characteristics as well as a dummy that takes a value of one if the respondent reports discussing such issues with their male peers rarely or very rarely (see columns 3 and 4 of Appendix Table A.3). We find significantly larger absolute misperceptions for respondents who report rarely discussing the topic. This pattern holds also when restricting the sample to underestimators only.

6.3 Preferences for the Female Breadwinner Model

In this study, we primarily focus on examining (beliefs about) men's preferences for couple equity when the alternative is the traditional male breadwinner model. Arguably, as long as

some couples specialize within the household, gender equality at the societal level can only be achieved if in some couples the man takes on the majority of the household responsibilities, while the woman is the main breadwinner. Are there men who state a preference for the 'female breadwinner model' if the alternative is to share all tasks equally? To study this question, we include two additional survey questions in our baseline survey. For the 1-child and the 2-child scenarios, respondents are asked to state whether they personally prefer option A (couple equity) or option B, which is the same as above, but with reversed gender roles.[28] The results are presented in Appendix Table A.14. Interestingly, there is a non-trivial proportion of men who state they would personally prefer a situation in which their wives are the main breadwinners. The share ranges between 12% and 26% in the 1-child scenario, and between 10% and 23% in the 2-child scenario. Interestingly, in all six countries, the share of women stating they prefer a female breadwinner model is *smaller* compared to the share of men stating they prefer it.[29] For example, in Spain, 16% of men state they prefer the female breadwinner model over an equitable division of tasks, while this is true for only 6% of women.

Could it be that some men have a preference for household specialization more generally, regardless of who it is that is supplying more market work? In Table A.15 we show that a (small) proportion of men (ranging between 7% and 13% in the 1-child scenario) state they prefer the unequal division, regardless of whether it is them or their spouse reducing their work hours. For women, these percentages range between 2% and 10%.

6.4 Potential Barriers

The majority of men in our sample state they prefer couple equity (over the male breadwinner model). Are the relatively young men in our sample more progressive than the men who already have children, or will these men also choose more traditional allocations of tasks once they have children, despite the fact that this may not reflect their preferences? While we cannot answer this question using our data, as we do not observe choices, we provide

[28] We note that we only elicited these two binary decisions rather than the continuous WTP for the female breadwinner model. The total household income was the same across the two options.

[29] These differences are statistically significant at the 5% level for 5 out of 6 countries.

some speculative arguments on the barriers men may encounter.

Different constraints may lead to a mismatch between preferences and realized behaviors. First, there could be social stigma or social image concerns arising from men reducing their work hours. Recent literature suggests that a wide range of behaviors are influenced by social image concerns and social pressure (see Bursztyn and Jensen, 2017). If men perceive the male breadwinner model to be socially desirable, they may choose a traditional allocation of tasks because of social image concerns or social pressure, even if this does not reflect their own preferences. The effects of social pressure, however, could be mitigated by making men more aware of the fact that the male breadwinner model may no longer be the socially desirable option. Indeed, our information experiment attempts to do exactly that. Even though we cannot measure real-life behavior in our setting, we do find strong effects of the information we provide on men's self-reported preferences for couple equity.

Beyond social image concerns, there may also be institutional constraints that prevent men from enacting their preferences and reducing their work hours, such as the lack of flexibility from the employer's side to reduce work hours below full-time work. The extent to which employees can adjust their workload varies across the countries in our sample. For example, in the United States, there is no federal law that specifically grants employees the unilateral right to request part-time work. In contrast, countries like Spain allow employees to request reduced working hours if they have children below the age of 12. Moreover, irrespective of the existing laws in any given country, employers might be more reluctant to grant flexible work arrangements to men than to women, and there may be a larger social stigma attached to men reducing their work hours in the workplace. Studying whether there is employer discrimination in granting flexible work arrangements based on gender is an interesting question for future research.

Furthermore, as discussed in the previous sections, a non-trivial proportion of women state they prefer the male breadwinner model over an equitable division of tasks. Among control group respondents, this share ranges between 15% and 36%. If men wish to accommodate their partners' preferences, women's own preferences may become a constraint to men's actions. In future research, it would be interesting to study household bargaining when

preferences within a couple are misaligned.

Last but not least, perceived prescribed behaviors or preferences for couple equity may change as a result of having children (Kuziemko et al. 2018). This could, for example, be the case if people's preferences are directly affected by their choices during the first year of the child's life, during which it is very common for the mother to take on more duties within the household. Studying how individual preferences for couple equity evolve over the life cycle is an interesting avenue for future research.

7 Conclusion

In this study, we survey 24,000 individuals across 6 countries, and document that the majority of men in all six countries state they prefer an equitable division of tasks within the household. At the same time, both men and women in all six countries substantially underestimate the share of men stating they prefer couple equity. Misperceptions about prevalent attitudes or societal norms can trap individuals in traditional gender roles. In such an equilibrium, correcting misperceptions holds substantial potential for fostering gender equality. In fact, we show that providing individuals with truthful information about the actual share of men preferring couple equity in their country shifts beliefs about the preferences of other men, own preferences for couple equity, as well as the willingness to pay for it. While we do not observe actual choices, we regard our survey experiment as a proof of concept.

Overall, our research suggests that men in the countries we study are more progressive than many people think. In future research, we may want to shift the focus to the question of which obstacles men face when trying to reduce their work hours or be more involved in the upbringing of their children. For example, it may be that their preferences do not align with the preferences of their partner. In fact, a non-trivial proportion of women in our sample does not actually prefer an equitable division of tasks. Men may also face constraints in the workplace. For example, men may fear more social stigma or employer discrimination compared to women if they ask their employers to reduce their work hours, and their requests may be less likely to be granted. Studying household bargaining when preferences about couple equity are misaligned as well as barriers to men reducing their work

hours in the workplace are interesting avenues for future work.

References

Akerlof, George A, and Rachel E Kranton. 2000. "Economics and Identity." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 115(3): 715–753.

Akerlof, George A, and Rachel E Kranton. 2010. *Identity Economics: How Our Identities Shape Our Work, Wages, and Well-Being.* Princeton University Press.

Alesina, Alberto, Armando Miano, and Stefanie Stantcheva. 2023. "Immigration and Redistribution." *The Review of Economic Studies*, 90(1): 1–39.

Alesina, Alberto, Paola Giuliano, and Nathan Nunn. 2013. "On the Origins of Gender Roles: Women and the Plough." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 128(2): 469–530.

Allport, Floyd Henry. 1924. *Social psychology.* Boston, Houghton.

Andre, Peter, Teodora Boneva, Felix Chopra, and Armin Falk. 2024*a*. "Globally Representative Evidence on the Actual and Perceived Support for Climate Action." *Nature Climate Change*, 1–7.

Andre, Peter, Teodora Boneva, Felix Chopra, and Armin Falk. 2024*b*. "Misperceived Social Norms and Willingness to Act Against Climate Change." *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 1–46.

Andresen, Martin Eckhoff, and Emily Nix. 2022. "What Causes the Child Penalty? Evidence from Adopting and Same-Sex Couples." *Journal of Labor Economics*, 40(4).

Auspurg, Katrin, Maria Iacovou, and Cheti Nicoletti. 2017. "Housework Share between Partners: Experimental Evidence on gender-specific Preferences." *Social science research*, 66: 118–139.

Bertrand, Marianne. 2011. "New Perspectives on Gender." In *Handbook of Labor Economics*. Vol. 4, Part B, , ed. Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, 1543–1590. Elsevier.

Bertrand, Marianne, Emir Kamenica, and Jessica Pan. 2015. "Gender Identity and Relative Income within Households." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 571–614.

Boelmann, Barbara, Anna Raute, and Uta Schönberg. forthcoming. "Wind of Change? Cultural Determinants of Maternal Labor Supply." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*.

Bursztyn, Leonardo, Alessandra L González, and David Yanagizawa-Drott. 2020. "Misperceived social norms: Women working outside the home in Saudi Arabia." *American Economic Review*, 110(10): 2997–3029.

Bursztyn, Leonardo, Alexander W Cappelen, Bertil Tungodden, Alessandra Voena, and David H Yanagizawa-Drott. 2023. "How are Gender Norms Perceived?" National Bureau of Economic Research.

Bursztyn, Leonardo, and David Y. Yang. 2022. "Misperceptions About Others." *Annual Review of Economics*, 14: 425–452.

Bursztyn, Leonardo, and Robert Jensen. 2017. "Social Image and Economic Behavior in the Field: Identifying, Understanding, and Shaping Social Pressure." *Annual Review of Economics*, 9: 131–153.

Cavapozzi, Danilo, Marco Francesconi, and Cheti Nicoletti. 2021. "The Impact of

Gender Role Norms on Mothers' Labor Supply." *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 186: 113–134.

Cortés, Patricia, Gizem Koşar, Jessica Pan, and Basit Zafar. forthcoming. "Should Mothers Work? How Perceptions of the Social Norm Affect Individual Attitudes Toward Work in the US." *Review of Economics and Statistics*.

Cortés, Patricia, and Jessica Pan. 2023. "Children and the Remaining Gender Gaps in the Labor Market." *Journal of Economic Literature*, 61(4): 1359–1409.

Delfino, Alexia. 2024. "Breaking gender barriers: Experimental evidence on men in pink-collar jobs." *American Economic Review*, 114(6): 1816–1853.

De Quidt, Jonathan, Johannes Haushofer, and Christopher Roth. 2018. "Measuring and Bounding Experimenter Demand." *American Economic Review*, 108(11): 3266–3302.

Eurostat. 2023. "European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions microdata 2004-2021 (Version 2, release 1)." *[Data set] doi: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/203647/16993001/EUSILC_DOI_2023_release_1.pdf*.

Falk, Armin, and Johannes Hermle. 2018. "Relationship of Gender Differences in Preferences to Economic Development and Gender Equality." *Science*, 362(6412).

Falk, Armin, Anke Becker, Thomas Dohmen, David Huffman, and Uwe Sunde. 2023. "The preference survey module: A validated instrument for measuring risk, time, and social preferences." *Management Science*, 69(4): 1935–1950.

Fernández, Raquel, Alessandra Fogli, and Claudia Olivetti. 2004. "Mothers and Sons: Preference Formation and Female Labor Force Dynamics." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119(4): 1249–1299.

Fernandez, Raquel, and Alessandra Fogli. 2009. "Culture: An Empirical Investigation of Beliefs, Work, and Fertility." *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 1(1): 146–77.

Flood, Sarah, King Miriam Rodgers Renae Ruggle Steven Warren J. Robert Backman Daniel Chen Annie Cooper Grace Richards Stephanie Schouweiler Megan, and Michael Westberry. 2023. "IPUMS CPS: Version 11.0 [dataset]."

Fortin, Nicole M. 2005. "Gender Role Attitudes and the Labour-market Outcomes of Women across OECD Countries." *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 21(3): 416–438.

Giuliano, Paola. 2020. "Gender and Culture." *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 36(4): 944–961.

Goebel, Jan, Markus M Grabka, Stefan Liebig, Martin Kroh, David Richter, Carsten Schröder, and Jürgen Schupp. 2019. "The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)." *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*, 239(2): 345–360.

Grewenig, Elisabeth, Philipp Lergetporer, and Katharina Werner. 2020. "Gender Norms and Labor-Supply Expectations: Experimental Evidence from Adolescents." *CESifo Working Paper No. 8611*.

Grigorieff, Alexis, Christopher Roth, and Diego Ubfal. 2020. "Does Information Change Attitudes Toward Immigrants?" *Demography*, 57: 1117–1143.

Haaland, Ingar, Christopher Roth, and Johannes Wohlfart. 2023. "Designing Information Provision Experiments." *Journal of Economic Literature*, 61(1): 3–40.

Hansen, Casper Worm, Peter Sandholt Jensen, and Christian Volmar Skovs-

gaard. 2015. "Modern Gender Roles and Agricultural History: The Neolithic Inheritance." *Journal of Economic Growth*, 20: 365–404.

Kleven, Henrik, Camille Landais, and Gabriel Leite-Mariante. forthcoming. "The Child Penalty Atlas." *The Review of Economic Studies*.

Kleven, Henrik, Camille Landais, and Jakob Egholt Søgaard. 2019a. "Children and Gender Inequality: Evidence from Denmark." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 11(4): 181–209.

Kleven, Henrik, Camille Landais, Johanna Posch, Andreas Steinhauer, and Josef Zweimüller. 2019b. "Child Penalties across Countries: Evidence and Explanations." *American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings*, 109: 122–26.

Kuziemko, Ilyana, Jessica Pan, Jenny Shen, and Ebonya Washington. 2018. "The Mommy Effect: Do Women Anticipate the Employment Effects of Motherhood?" National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 24740.

Manski, Charles F. 2004. "Measuring Expectations." *Econometrica*, 72(5): 1329–1376.

Miller, Dale T, and Cathy McFarland. 1987. "Pluralistic Ignorance: When Similarity is Interpreted as Dissimilarity." *Journal of Personality and social Psychology*, 53(2): 298.

Mummolo, Jonathan, and Erik Peterson. 2019. "Demand Effects in Survey Experiments: An Empirical Assessment." *American Political Science Review*, 113(2): 517–529.

Nicoletti, Cheti, Kjell G Salvanes, and Emma Tominey. 2018. "The Family Peer Effect on Mothers' Labor Supply." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 10(3): 206–34.

OECD. 2019. "OECD Family Database: LMF1.2 Maternal employment." *https://www.oecd.org/els/family/database.htm, Accessed on 9 August 2022.*

OECD. 2023. "OECD Tax-Benefit Web Calculator." Accessed: 2023-06-16.

Ogburn, William F. 1957. "Cultural Lag as Theory." *Sociology & Social Research*.

Oh, Suanna. 2023. "Does Identity Affect Labor Supply?" *American Economic Review*, 113(8): 2055–2083.

Siminski, Peter, and Rhiannon Yetsenga. 2022. "Specialization, Comparative Advantage, and the Sexual Division of Labor." *Journal of Labor Economics*, 40(4): 851–887.

Stratton, Leslie S. 2012. "The Role of Preferences and Opportunity Costs in Determining the Time Allocated to Housework." *American Economic Review*, 102(3): 606–611.

For online publication only:

Are men's preferences for couple equity misperceived? Evidence from six countries

Teodora Boneva, Ana Brás-Monteiro, Marta Golin, and Christopher Rauh

April 11, 2025

Appendix A provides additional figures and tables. Appendix B provides more details on the data collection and data analysis. Appendix C contains the main survey instructions.

A Supplementary Figures and Tables

Figure A.1: Mothers staying home or working part-time



Notes: This figure displays the percentage of women (15-64 years old) with at least one child aged 0-14 staying home or working part-time (rather than full-time). Source: 2019 OECD Family Database (OECD, 2019). Countries included in our study are highlighted in red.

Figure A.2: Actual and perceived shares of men preferring couple equity



Notes: This figure plots the average perceived share of men preferring couple equity (when there is one child) in each country against the actual share. The actual shares are computed using the baseline survey; the perceived shares are computed using the main survey (all observations: control and treatment). The area is partitioned by the 45-degree line into segments representing overestimators (above) and underestimators (below) of the actual share of men preferring couple equity. The graphs display the correlation between the perceived and actual shares, as well as the corresponding p-values in parentheses.

Figure A.3: Beliefs about men's preferences for couple equity - Distribution



Notes: This figure uses data from the main survey and shows the distribution, separately for each country, of the perceived share of men preferring couple equity in the scenario in which the couple has one child. The red line indicates the average guess. The vertical black line shows the actual share of men in the country who prefer couple equity, calculated from baseline survey data. We report the p-values of the two-sided t-test of the difference in means between the beliefs about men's preferences and the actual shares of men preferring couple equity.

Figure A.4: Relative WTP for couple equity



Notes: This figure uses data from the control group in the main survey and shows the distribution, separately for each country, of all individuals' relative WTP for couple equity. The relative WTP is computed by dividing the respondent's WTP by total household income in the initial scenario, multiplied by 100.

Figure A.5: Frequency of discussion of gender equality topics with male friends and relatives



Notes: This figure plots the distribution of the answers to the question of how frequently the respondent discusses with their male friends and relatives the topic of whether fathers should reduce their work hours when they have young children. The distribution is plotted separately for men and women, and all respondents of the main survey are included.

Table A.1: Samples representativeness

	Germany			Italy			Poland		
	W1	W2	Pop	W1	W2	Pop	W1	W2	Pop
Female	42.80	45.77	43.01	42.90	42.97	43.09	44.00	49.53	43.85
Uni degree	25.50	26.93	25.51	24.10	24.13	24.07	32.20	34.77	32.48
Age*	33.41	31.27	28.64	30.67	30.78	29.02	25.91	27.20	29.86
Married*	17.40	15.17	14.51	13.60	15.77	13.74	22.70	26.00	26.57
Regions									
Region 1	18.90	19.53	18.87	26.30	25.93	26.30	18.90	19.73	18.66
Region 2	15.90	16.47	15.86	23.80	24.03	23.76	16.10	15.00	15.96
Region 3	26.80	26.17	26.82	10.70	10.70	10.74	10.70	11.87	10.71
Region 4	14.50	15.20	14.50	19.30	19.33	19.31	15.30	16.20	15.63
Region 5	23.90	22.63	23.94	19.90	20.00	19.90	10.30	9.23	10.30
Region 6							14.10	12.33	14.11
Region 7							14.60	15.63	14.63
Observations	1000	3000		1000	3000		1000	3000	

	Spain			Sweden			US		
	W1	W2	Pop	W1	W2	Pop	W1	W2	Pop
Female	45.30	45.93	44.74	43.00	49.47	43.31	44.10	45.67	44.16
Uni degree	43.80	45.07	43.75	30.30	32.97	30.32	32.70	31.60	32.70
Age*	30.89	29.70	30.01	28.44	29.76	28.51	33.15	32.48	28.48
Married*	20.10	16.03	24.49	21.00	23.40	17.93	16.00	16.07	18.50
Regions									
Region 1	8.40	8.47	8.36	41.90	41.30	41.84	17.70	17.93	19.20
Region 2	8.60	8.87	8.77	42.80	44.77	42.83	19.20	19.33	17.72
Region 3	15.50	15.67	15.35	15.30	13.93	15.33	37.40	38.73	37.37
Region 4	10.70	11.13	10.81				25.70	24.00	25.71
Region 5	30.00	29.50	29.78						
Region 6	21.70	22.03	21.71						
Region 7	5.10	4.33	5.21						
Observations	1000	3000		1000	3000		1000	3000	

Notes: This table displays the sample characteristics of respondents in wave 1 (column 1), wave 2 (column 2), as well the characteristics of a nationally representative sample of the population of interest (column 3), separately for each country. The national population figures are calculated from the relevant population of respondents to the 2021 EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) for Italy, Poland, Spain and Sweden, the 2019 German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) for Germany, and the 2022-2023 ASEC of the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the United States. See Appendix B.3 for more details on the data sources. * indicates variables that were not targeted through the quota-based sampling approach.

Table A.2: Actual and perceived men's preferences for couple equity, by gender of the respondent

	Panel A: Male respondents (perceptions)											
	Germany		Italy		Poland		Spain		Sweden		US	
	Act.	Perc.	Act.	Perc.	Act.	Perc.	Act.	Perc.	Act.	Perc.	Act.	Perc.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
1-child	73.8	44.1	70.8	46.3	56.4	42.5	83.9	52.6	72.5	49.7	62.4	43.1
		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)
2-child	64.7	40.8	70.1	43.1	52.1	40.7	79.9	50.3	68.1	46.9	55.8	38.2
		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)
Obs. (1)	572	1627	571	1711	560	1514	547	1623	570	1516	559	1630
Obs. (2)	572	816	571	841	560	761	547	806	570	764	559	811
	Panel B: Female respondents (perceptions)											
	Germany		Italy		Poland		Spain		Sweden		US	
	Act.	Perc.	Act.	Perc.	Act.	Perc.	Act.	Perc.	Act.	Perc.	Act.	Perc.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
1-child	73.8	39.6	70.8	38.7	56.4	37.7	83.9	43.2	72.5	44.0	62.4	39.6
		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)
2-child	64.7	34.7	70.1	34.8	52.1	35.5	79.9	39.0	68.1	40.3	55.8	35.7
		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)
Obs. (1)	572	1373	571	1289	560	1486	547	1377	570	1484	559	1370
Obs. (2)	572	680	571	651	560	732	547	703	570	736	559	679
p-value (1)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)
p-value (2)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)

Notes: This table displays the actual share of men preferring couple equity in each country, alongside the perceived share of men preferring couple equity, separately for male and female respondents. Results are displayed both for the 1-child and 2-children scenarios. The actual shares are obtained from male respondents in the baseline survey. The perceived shares for the 1-child scenario are computed using the answers of all respondents in the main survey, and the perceived shares for the 2-children scenario are computed using only control group respondents from the main survey. Accordingly, the number of observations is displayed separately for the 1-child scenario (Obs. (1)) and the 2-children scenario (Obs. (2)). The last two rows display the result of a t-test of the difference between perceptions of male and female respondents: p-value (1) refers to the difference in perceptions in the 1-child scenario, and p-value (2) refers to the difference in perceptions in the 2-children scenario.

Table A.3: Determinants of misperceptions about men's preferences

Dependent variable: Absolute prediction error (in percentage points)				
	(1) Full Sample	(2) Only Underest.	(3) Full Sample	(4) Only Underest.
Female	4.653***	4.173***	4.696***	4.212***
	(1.089)	(0.941)	(1.104)	(0.953)
Age	0.032	0.050	0.030	0.047
	(0.033)	(0.026)	(0.033)	(0.025)
Own mother working FT	-1.740***	-1.477**	-1.740***	-1.483**
	(0.339)	(0.383)	(0.343)	(0.383)
Own mother working PT	-1.110**	-0.964*	-1.096**	-0.957*
	(0.415)	(0.435)	(0.421)	(0.438)
Own father working FT	0.015	-0.074	0.015	-0.076
	(0.372)	(0.441)	(0.368)	(0.441)
Own father working PT	-0.368	-0.810	-0.376	-0.822
	(0.234)	(0.527)	(0.232)	(0.523)
Religious	-0.952**	-0.970**	-0.879**	-0.907**
	(0.315)	(0.305)	(0.312)	(0.305)
University degree	0.011	0.083	0.035	0.108
	(0.601)	(0.512)	(0.607)	(0.516)
Married	0.472	0.291	0.517	0.336
	(0.371)	(0.421)	(0.360)	(0.412)
Discuss rarely			0.907***	0.832***
			(0.221)	(0.195)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	18000	15545	17998	15543
R-squared	.095	.094	.096	.095

Notes: This table shows OLS regression estimates using all respondents from the main survey. The dependent variable in each column is the absolute difference between the respondent's belief about men's preferences for couple equity (in the 1-child scenario), and the actual share of men preferring couple equity. Column 1 and 3 use the full sample, while column 2 and 4 focus on the subset of respondents who strictly underestimate the actual share of men preferring couple equity in their country. All regressions include controls for gender (indicator), age (continuous), having a university degree (indicator), being married or in a stable relationship (indicator), the mother/father working full-time/part-time (four separate indicators), considering religion as important (indicator), and country-region fixed effects. Columns 3 and 4 additionally include a dummy that takes value one if the respondent reports to discuss with their male peers rarely or very rarely about the topic on whether fathers should reduce their work hours when they have young children ('Discuss rarely').

Table A.4: Balance table

	Germany			Italy			Poland		
	Control	Treat.	Diff.	Control	Treat.	Diff.	Control	Treat.	Diff.
Female	0.45	0.46	-0.01	0.44	0.42	0.01	0.49	0.50	-0.01
Beliefs about men's prefs.	42.17	42.00	0.16	42.41	43.71	-1.30*	40.85	39.39	1.47**
University	0.27	0.27	-0.01	0.23	0.25	-0.02	0.34	0.35	-0.01
Age	31.44	31.11	0.34	30.66	30.89	-0.23	27.28	27.12	0.16
Married	0.15	0.15	0.00	0.15	0.16	-0.01	0.26	0.26	0.01
Migrant background	0.22	0.22	0.00	0.11	0.11	0.00	0.03	0.04	-0.01
Own mother working FT	0.27	0.28	-0.01	0.34	0.35	-0.01	0.45	0.45	-0.00
Own mother working PT	0.34	0.37	-0.04**	0.27	0.25	0.02	0.23	0.23	-0.00
Own father working FT	0.88	0.88	-0.00	0.92	0.92	0.00	0.82	0.83	-0.00
Own father working PT	0.03	0.03	0.00	0.03	0.05	-0.01	0.07	0.07	0.00
Religious	0.23	0.24	-0.01	0.36	0.37	-0.01	0.40	0.38	0.02
Observations	1496	1504		1492	1508		1493	1507	
p-value F test	.435			.395			.745		

	Spain			Sweden			United States		
	Control	Treat.	Diff.	Control	Treat.	Diff.	Control	Treat.	Diff.
Female	0.47	0.45	0.01	0.49	0.50	-0.01	0.46	0.46	-0.00
Beliefs about men's prefs.	48.38	48.14	0.23	47.28	46.40	0.88	41.87	41.14	0.72
University	0.46	0.44	0.02	0.33	0.33	0.00	0.31	0.32	-0.01
Age	29.89	29.52	0.37	29.77	29.75	0.02	32.59	32.36	0.23
Married	0.16	0.16	0.00	0.24	0.23	0.01	0.16	0.16	-0.00
Migrant background	0.16	0.15	0.01	0.24	0.26	-0.02	0.21	0.20	0.01
Own mother working FT	0.38	0.37	0.01	0.46	0.48	-0.01	0.43	0.43	-0.01
Own mother working PT	0.26	0.29	-0.02	0.37	0.36	0.01	0.20	0.21	-0.00
Own father working FT	0.87	0.85	0.02	0.86	0.85	0.00	0.79	0.80	-0.02
Own father working PT	0.08	0.09	-0.01	0.07	0.07	-0.00	0.04	0.05	-0.01
Religious	0.28	0.25	0.03*	0.17	0.17	-0.00	0.50	0.47	0.03*
Observations	1509	1491		1500	1500		1490	1510	
p-value F test	.381			.944			.546		

Notes: This balance table displays the average characteristics for the control group and the treatment group, separately for each country. The variable 'Married' takes value one for respondents who are married or in a registered partnership, and zero otherwise. The variable 'Migrant background' is an indicator of having a parent born outside the country. 'Working mother/father' are indicators for the mother/father working full-time or part-time when the respondent was 1-5 years old. The third column in each country ('Diff.') shows whether the difference between the control and treatment group is statistically significant: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.5: Treatment effects on posterior beliefs: No controls

	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	Sweden	US	Pooled
Panel A: Treatment effect							
Treatment	0.206***	0.213***	0.111***	0.246***	0.183***	0.160***	0.187***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.019)
Control mean	0.380	0.394	0.381	0.450	0.437	0.371	0.402
Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Observations	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	18000
Panel B: Treatment effect heterogeneity by prior beliefs							
	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	Sweden	US	Pooled
Treat. x Underest.	0.222***	0.241***	0.167***	0.269***	0.218***	0.195***	0.221***
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.014)
Treat. x Overest.	0.013	-0.058***	-0.066***	-0.048**	-0.022*	0.009	-0.029
	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.011)	(0.023)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.015)
Underestimator	0.353***	0.360***	0.314***	0.421***	0.385***	0.320***	0.355***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Overestimator	0.672***	0.716***	0.601***	0.843***	0.727***	0.597***	0.682***
	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.019)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.012)
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Observations	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	18000
Panel C: Treatment effect heterogeneity by gender							
	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	Sweden	US	Pooled
Treat. x Male	0.187***	0.184***	0.095***	0.212***	0.161***	0.152***	0.166***
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.016)
Treat. x Female	0.228***	0.250***	0.128***	0.285***	0.207***	0.169***	0.210***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.023)
Male	0.408***	0.431***	0.407***	0.503***	0.469***	0.382***	0.420***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.006)
Female	0.347***	0.348***	0.355***	0.390***	0.403***	0.357***	0.354***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.015)
p-value	0.003	0.000	0.007	0.000	0.001	0.231	0.004
Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Observations	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	18000

Notes: This table shows OLS regression estimates using all respondents from the main survey, separately for each country in the study as well as for the sample of pooled countries. The dependent variable in all regressions is the belief about men's preferences for couple equity in the 2-children scenario (0-1). The p-values refer to tests for the equality of the following coefficients: 'Treat. x Underest.' versus 'Treat. x Overest.' (panel B), and 'Treat. x Male' versus 'Treat. x Female' (panel C). All regressions have no controls except for the pooled regression that has country fixed effects. We report robust standard errors in parentheses in the country regressions, and clustered standard errors (at the country level) in the pooled regressions. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.6: Treatment effects on preferences for couple equity - Controlling for priors

	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	Sweden	US	Pooled
Panel A: Treatment effect							
Treatment	0.058***	0.031**	0.049***	0.035***	0.034**	0.027	0.039***
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.005)
Control mean	0.652	0.761	0.614	0.820	0.746	0.603	0.700
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	18000
Panel B: Treatment effect heterogeneity by prior beliefs							
Treat. x Underest.	0.059***	0.034**	0.057***	0.041***	0.039**	0.026	0.043***
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.005)
Treat. x Overest.	0.067	-0.003	0.021	-0.062	0.007	0.027	0.014
	(0.048)	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.038)	(0.029)	(0.040)	(0.010)
Underestimator	0.318***	0.673***	0.406***	0.608***	0.421***	0.485***	0.396***
	(0.058)	(0.071)	(0.061)	(0.050)	(0.067)	(0.081)	(0.028)
Overestimator	0.192**	0.634***	0.391***	0.618***	0.427***	0.406***	0.373***
	(0.077)	(0.081)	(0.084)	(0.059)	(0.078)	(0.096)	(0.045)
p-value	0.879	0.370	0.358	0.010	0.337	0.973	0.027
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	18000
Panel C: Treatment effect heterogeneity by gender							
Treat. x Male	0.066***	0.049**	0.058**	0.052***	0.041**	0.052**	0.053***
	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.004)
Treat. x Female	0.048**	0.007	0.039*	0.015	0.027	-0.004	0.022**
	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.008)
Male	0.353***	0.683***	0.423***	0.613***	0.426***	0.512***	0.405***
	(0.057)	(0.071)	(0.058)	(0.051)	(0.066)	(0.080)	(0.025)
Female	0.420***	0.781***	0.623***	0.686***	0.474***	0.597***	0.500***
	(0.056)	(0.069)	(0.053)	(0.047)	(0.064)	(0.079)	(0.037)
p-value	0.577	0.158	0.574	0.153	0.630	0.115	0.005
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	18000

Notes: This table shows OLS regression estimates using all respondents from the main survey, separately for each country in the study as well as for the sample of pooled countries. The dependent variable in all regressions is the preference for couple equity in the 1-child scenario (0-1). The p-values refer to tests for the equality of the following coefficients: 'Treat. x Underest.' versus 'Treat. x Overest.' (panel B), and 'Treat. x Male' versus 'Treat. x Female' (panel C). All regressions include controls for prior beliefs, gender, age, having a university degree, being married or in a stable relationship (indicator), the mother/father working full-time/part-time (four indicators), considering religion as important, and country-region fixed effects. We report robust standard errors in parentheses in the country regressions, and clustered standard errors (at the country level) in the pooled regressions. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.7: Treatment effects on preferences for couple equity: No controls

	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	Sweden	US	Pooled
Panel A: Treatment effect							
Treatment	0.060***	0.033**	0.049***	0.036***	0.032**	0.028	0.040***
	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.005)
Control mean	0.652	0.761	0.614	0.820	0.746	0.603	0.700
Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Observations	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	18000
Panel B: Treatment effect heterogeneity by prior beliefs							
Treat. x Underest.	0.056***	0.036**	0.063***	0.043***	0.032*	0.030	0.044***
	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.005)
Treat. x Overest.	0.082*	-0.004	0.017	-0.063*	0.015	0.025	0.016
	(0.048)	(0.039)	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.029)	(0.039)	(0.011)
Underestimator	0.641***	0.749***	0.568***	0.809***	0.722***	0.580***	0.648***
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.003)
Overestimator	0.770***	0.875***	0.763***	0.962***	0.881***	0.707***	0.800***
	(0.038)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.028)	(0.011)
p-value	0.616	0.334	0.222	0.006	0.604	0.893	0.053
Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Observations	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	18000
Panel C: Treatment effect heterogeneity by gender							
Treat. x Male	0.068***	0.051**	0.059**	0.054***	0.037*	0.054**	0.054***
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.004)
Treat. x Female	0.051**	0.010	0.036	0.016	0.027	-0.004	0.023**
	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.008)
Male	0.627***	0.732***	0.516***	0.790***	0.736***	0.570***	0.626***
	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.013)
Female	0.681***	0.799***	0.714***	0.853***	0.757***	0.644***	0.705***
	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.013)
p-value	0.611	0.172	0.514	0.152	0.739	0.101	0.008
Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Observations	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	18000

Notes: This table shows OLS regression estimates using all respondents from the main survey, separately for each country as well as for the pooled sample. The dependent variable in all regressions is a binary indicator for preferring couple equity in the 1-child scenario. The p-values refer to tests for the equality of the following coefficients: 'Treat. x Underest.' versus 'Treat. x Overest.' (panel B), and 'Treat. x Male' versus 'Treat. x Female' (panel C). All regressions have no controls except for the pooled regression that has country fixed effects. We report robust standard errors in parentheses in the country regressions, and clustered standard errors (at the country level) in the pooled regressions. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.8: Robustness check: Restricting the sample to heterosexual / bisexual individuals

	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	Sweden	US	Pooled
	Panel A - Dependent variable: posterior beliefs						
Treatment	0.207***	0.210***	0.118***	0.243***	0.183***	0.159***	0.187***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.018)
Control mean	0.378	0.396	0.376	0.449	0.435	0.372	0.401
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2671	2800	2681	2701	2717	2722	16292
	Panel B - Dependent variable: preferences for couple equity						
	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	Sweden	US	Pooled
Treatment	0.061***	0.038**	0.039**	0.039***	0.038**	0.034*	0.042***
	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.004)
Control mean	0.638	0.753	0.603	0.810	0.733	0.591	0.689
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2671	2800	2681	2701	2717	2722	16292
	Panel C - Dependent variable: relative WTP						
	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	Sweden	US	Pooled
Treatment	8.128***	7.141***	3.527**	6.327***	4.508***	2.116	5.319***
	(1.837)	(1.667)	(1.676)	(1.819)	(1.745)	(1.757)	(0.927)
Control mean	20.388	30.567	15.588	39.691	26.252	12.802	24.296
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2671	2800	2681	2701	2717	2722	16292
	Panel D - Dependent variable: donation to *MenCare*						
	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	Sweden	US	Pooled
Treatment	2.244*	0.778	-0.133	0.569	0.411	-0.662	0.544
	(1.160)	(1.119)	(1.156)	(1.199)	(1.193)	(1.168)	(0.401)
Control mean	42.642	47.327	45.315	42.709	42.572	47.470	44.684
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2671	2800	2681	2701	2717	2722	16292
	Panel E - Dependent variable: policy agreement						
	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	Sweden	US	Pooled
Treatment	-0.010	0.004	0.015	-0.016	0.006	-0.025	-0.003
	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.006)
Control mean	0.683	0.830	0.727	0.802	0.552	0.669	0.711
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2671	2800	2681	2701	2717	2722	16292

Notes: This table shows OLS regression estimates using only self-declared heterosexual and bisexual individuals from the main survey, separately for each country in the study as well as for the sample of pooled countries. The outcome variables are displayed at the top of each panel. All regressions in all five panels include controls for gender (indicator), age (continuous), having a university degree (indicator), being married or in a stable relationship (indicator), the mother/father working full-time/part-time (four separate indicators), considering religion as important (indicator), and country-region fixed effects. Significance: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.9: Relative WTP

	Panel A: Full Sample							
	Average	p10	p25	p50	p75	p90	% lb	% ub
Germany	21.66	-25.71	-2.86	14.29	37.14	92.86	1.40	6.35
Italy	32.05	-22.50	2.50	27.50	62.50	105.00	2.41	9.25
Poland	17.04	-32.50	-12.50	7.50	37.50	105.00	3.15	8.51
Spain	41.20	-7.50	2.50	27.50	81.25	125.00	1.13	13.85
Sweden	27.87	-23.51	-2.61	18.28	49.63	108.96	2.33	7.47
United States	14.20	-36.11	-13.89	2.78	30.56	86.11	2.75	4.97
	Panel B: Male respondents							
	Average	p10	p25	p50	p75	p90	% lb	% ub
Germany	19.96	-25.71	-2.86	8.57	34.29	82.86	1.72	5.15
Italy	28.65	-22.50	-2.50	22.50	57.50	105.00	1.78	7.49
Poland	7.25	-37.50	-22.50	2.50	22.50	72.50	4.07	4.99
Spain	38.50	-12.50	2.50	22.50	72.50	125.00	1.61	14.64
Sweden	23.84	-18.28	-2.61	13.06	44.40	82.46	2.88	5.24
United States	13.47	-36.11	-13.89	2.78	30.56	86.11	2.84	5.67
	Panel C: Female Respondents							
	Average	p10	p25	p50	p75	p90	% lb	% ub
Germany	23.70	-31.43	-2.86	14.29	37.14	114.29	1.03	7.79
Italy	36.45	-22.50	2.50	32.50	77.50	110.00	3.23	11.52
Poland	27.21	-22.50	-2.50	17.50	57.50	110.00	2.19	12.16
Spain	44.29	-2.50	7.50	27.50	81.25	125.00	0.57	12.94
Sweden	32.06	-23.51	2.61	18.28	60.07	123.88	1.77	9.78
United States	15.06	-36.11	-13.89	8.33	30.56	86.11	2.65	4.12

Notes: This table shows the distribution of relative WTP across countries for the full sample, male respondents only, and female respondents only. The first six columns show, respectively, the average relative WTP and the percentiles 10, 25, 50, 75 and 90 of the WTP distribution. The last two columns show the percentage of respondents hitting the lower or upper bounds of the staircase.

Table A.10: Treatment effects on relative WTP for couple equity: No Controls

	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	Sweden	US	Pooled
Panel A: Treatment effect							
Treatment	7.757***	5.923***	4.268**	5.962***	4.632***	1.580	5.020***
	(1.765)	(1.635)	(1.663)	(1.765)	(1.732)	(1.689)	(0.852)
Control mean	21.663	32.054	17.036	41.195	27.872	14.196	25.701
Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Observations	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	18000
Panel B: Treatment effect heterogeneity by prior beliefs							
	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	Sweden	US	Pooled
Treat. x Underest.	6.598***	6.361***	6.426***	6.603***	5.345***	2.378	5.661***
	(1.833)	(1.734)	(1.869)	(1.828)	(1.893)	(1.844)	(0.655)
Treat. x Overest.	17.187***	1.282	-2.116	-2.414	-0.333	-1.453	0.973
	(6.189)	(4.768)	(3.510)	(6.533)	(4.171)	(4.137)	(2.320)
Underestimator	20.965***	30.757***	13.274***	40.029***	25.570***	12.141***	21.668***
	(1.289)	(1.232)	(1.286)	(1.306)	(1.328)	(1.302)	(0.381)
Overestimator	29.252***	44.201***	29.321***	56.947***	40.782***	23.362***	35.648***
	(4.392)	(3.528)	(2.545)	(4.558)	(2.926)	(2.884)	(0.975)
p-value	0.101	0.317	0.032	0.184	0.215	0.398	0.085
Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Observations	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	18000
Panel C: Treatment effect heterogeneity by gender							
	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	Sweden	US	Pooled
Treat. x Male	6.257***	7.192***	4.619**	5.885**	5.195**	2.080	5.246***
	(2.273)	(2.097)	(2.212)	(2.428)	(2.263)	(2.280)	(0.738)
Treat. x Female	9.463***	4.438*	3.517	6.232**	3.934	0.981	4.764***
	(2.754)	(2.583)	(2.385)	(2.561)	(2.617)	(2.516)	(1.151)
Male	19.963***	28.650***	7.254***	38.500***	23.840***	13.474***	19.428***
	(1.609)	(1.501)	(1.523)	(1.762)	(1.587)	(1.628)	(1.275)
Female	23.702***	36.452***	27.206***	44.285***	32.057***	15.059***	27.305***
	(1.918)	(1.833)	(1.691)	(1.794)	(1.846)	(1.752)	(1.502)
p-value	0.369	0.408	0.735	0.922	0.716	0.746	0.586
Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Observations	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	18000

Notes: This table shows OLS regression estimates using all respondents from the main survey, separately for each country as well as for the pooled sample. The dependent variable in all regressions is the relative WTP for couple equity in the 1-child scenario. The p-values refer to tests for the equality of the following coefficients: 'Treat. x Underest.' versus 'Treat. x Overest.' (panel B), and 'Treat. x Male' versus 'Treat. x Female' (panel C). All regressions have no controls except for the pooled regression that has country fixed effects. We report robust standard errors in parentheses in the country regressions, and clustered standard errors (at the country level) in the pooled regressions. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.11: Treatment effects on relative WTP for couple equity: Tobit regressions

	Panel A: Treatment effect					
	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	Sweden	US
Treatment	7.518***	6.575***	3.747**	6.408***	4.421***	1.421
	(1.741)	(1.784)	(1.754)	(1.997)	(1.682)	(1.773)
Control mean	21.663	32.054	17.036	41.195	27.872	14.196
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000
	Panel B: Treatment effect heterogeneity by prior beliefs					
	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	Sweden	US
Treat. x Underest.	6.436***	7.183***	6.068***	7.226***	5.403***	1.972
	(1.807)	(1.883)	(1.942)	(2.054)	(1.831)	(1.924)
Treat. x Overest.	16.479***	0.251	-3.246	-4.324	-1.812	-0.556
	(6.180)	(5.378)	(3.849)	(7.938)	(4.144)	(4.405)
Underestimator	5.868	37.932***	16.002***	10.379	-9.756	28.820***
	(5.544)	(7.863)	(5.741)	(6.845)	(7.074)	(9.545)
Overestimator	14.131*	53.442***	35.018***	31.934***	5.136	38.991***
	(7.235)	(8.607)	(6.341)	(8.497)	(7.582)	(9.907)
p-value	0.119	0.224	0.031	0.159	0.111	0.598
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000
	Panel C: Treatment effect heterogeneity by gender					
	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	Sweden	US
Treat. x Male	6.163***	7.673***	4.147*	5.726**	5.207**	2.014
	(2.265)	(2.289)	(2.318)	(2.748)	(2.211)	(2.404)
Treat. x Female	9.119***	5.105*	3.333	7.211**	3.619	0.715
	(2.707)	(2.825)	(2.649)	(2.915)	(2.542)	(2.613)
Male	7.121	40.062***	19.555***	12.827*	-8.672	30.472***
	(5.608)	(7.943)	(5.868)	(6.848)	(7.098)	(9.611)
Female	10.358*	49.420***	39.258***	17.291**	1.059	32.410***
	(5.752)	(8.070)	(5.578)	(6.761)	(7.069)	(9.505)
p-value	0.404	0.480	0.817	0.711	0.637	0.714
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000

Notes: This table shows Tobit regression estimates using all respondents from the main survey, separately for each country. The dependent variable in all regressions is the relative WTP for couple equity in the 1-child scenario. The p-values refer to tests for the equality of the following coefficients: 'Treat. x Underest.' versus 'Treat. x Overest.' (panel B), and 'Treat. x Male' versus 'Treat. x Female' (panel C). All regressions include controls for gender, age, having a university degree, being married or in a stable relationship (indicator), the mother/father working full-time/part-time (four indicators), considering religion as important, and country-region fixed effects. We report robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.12: Treatment effects on donation to *MenCare*

	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	Sweden	US	Pooled
Panel A: Treatment effect							
Treatment	2.903***	0.842	0.027	0.498	0.355	-1.140	0.588
	(1.094)	(1.084)	(1.102)	(1.141)	(1.137)	(1.106)	(0.543)
Control mean	42.354	47.312	45.229	42.424	42.672	47.909	44.642
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	18000
Panel B: Treatment effect heterogeneity by prior beliefs							
	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	Sweden	US	Pooled
Treat. x Underest.	3.392***	0.959	0.952	0.405	0.373	-0.706	0.933
	(1.147)	(1.134)	(1.246)	(1.179)	(1.238)	(1.216)	(0.567)
Treat. x Overest.	-1.755	-0.102	-3.222	1.630	0.348	-3.071	-1.608
	(3.638)	(3.643)	(2.367)	(4.464)	(2.909)	(2.690)	(0.852)
Underestimator	44.802***	49.790***	47.703***	39.344***	31.990***	51.048***	42.708***
	(3.464)	(4.865)	(3.524)	(3.710)	(4.537)	(4.970)	(1.687)
Overestimator	45.596***	48.528***	49.196***	35.833***	31.017***	53.818***	43.342***
	(4.395)	(5.341)	(3.841)	(4.710)	(4.884)	(5.209)	(2.264)
p-value	0.177	0.781	0.119	0.791	0.994	0.423	0.050
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	18000
Panel C: Treatment effect heterogeneity by gender							
	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	Sweden	US	Pooled
Treat. x Male	4.620***	1.316	0.292	1.105	0.680	-1.982	1.022
	(1.483)	(1.463)	(1.602)	(1.590)	(1.663)	(1.542)	(0.893)
Treat. x Female	0.877	0.212	-0.243	-0.217	0.024	-0.138	0.090
	(1.616)	(1.604)	(1.510)	(1.632)	(1.551)	(1.573)	(0.172)
Male	44.013***	49.286***	47.814***	38.735***	31.797***	51.906***	42.637***
	(3.494)	(4.875)	(3.576)	(3.733)	(4.532)	(4.972)	(1.756)
Female	48.214***	49.899***	49.013***	38.722***	33.021***	51.101***	43.758***
	(3.514)	(4.906)	(3.375)	(3.676)	(4.459)	(4.889)	(1.791)
p-value	0.088	0.610	0.808	0.562	0.773	0.402	0.279
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	18000

Notes: This table shows OLS regression estimates using all respondents from the main survey, separately for each country in the study as well as for the sample of pooled countries. The dependent variable in all regressions is the proportion of the total amount allocated to the NGO **MenCare**. The p-values refer to tests for the equality of the following coefficients: 'Treat. x Underest.' versus 'Treat. x Overest.' (panel B), and 'Treat. x Male' versus 'Treat. x Female' (panel C). All regressions include controls for gender, age, having a university degree, being married or in a stable relationship (indicator), the mother/father working full-time/part-time (four indicators), considering religion as important, and country-region fixed effects. We report robust standard errors in parentheses in the country regressions, and clustered standard errors (at the country level) in the pooled regressions. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.13: Treatment effects on policy support

	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	Sweden	US	Pooled
Panel A: Treatment effect							
Treatment	-0.017	0.003	0.009	-0.021	0.004	-0.024	-0.007
	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.006)
Control mean	0.687	0.833	0.733	0.802	0.559	0.669	0.714
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	18000
Panel B: Treatment effect heterogeneity by prior beliefs							
Treat. x Underest.	-0.013	0.001	0.008	-0.017	0.002	-0.035*	-0.008
	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.006)
Treat. x Overest.	-0.056	0.021	0.014	-0.072	0.013	0.029	0.002
	(0.057)	(0.046)	(0.033)	(0.052)	(0.045)	(0.041)	(0.013)
Underestimator	0.700***	0.806***	0.721***	0.830***	0.748***	0.780***	0.741***
	(0.055)	(0.067)	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.072)	(0.086)	(0.041)
Overestimator	0.705***	0.781***	0.757***	0.939***	0.771***	0.770***	0.758***
	(0.067)	(0.072)	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.078)	(0.090)	(0.038)
p-value	0.467	0.682	0.876	0.315	0.818	0.164	0.525
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	18000
Panel C: Treatment effect heterogeneity by gender							
Treat. x Male	-0.027	0.002	0.023	-0.024	0.015	-0.009	-0.003
	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.008)
Treat. x Female	-0.004	0.004	-0.006	-0.017	-0.008	-0.042*	-0.011
	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.007)
Male	0.706***	0.802***	0.720***	0.842***	0.742***	0.771***	0.740***
	(0.056)	(0.067)	(0.054)	(0.050)	(0.073)	(0.086)	(0.039)
Female	0.768***	0.879***	0.878***	0.906***	0.870***	0.814***	0.831***
	(0.055)	(0.066)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.070)	(0.085)	(0.040)
p-value	0.507	0.922	0.365	0.793	0.523	0.332	0.449
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	18000

Notes: This table shows OLS regression estimates using all respondents from the main survey, separately for each country in the study as well as for the sample of pooled countries. The dependent variable in all regressions is a binary indicator describing support for the statement 'The national government should do more to promote the involvement of fathers in the upbringing of their children'. The p-values refer to tests for the equality of the following coefficients: 'Treat. x Underest.' versus 'Treat. x Overest.' (panel B), and 'Treat. x Male' versus 'Treat. x Female' (panel C). All regressions include controls for gender, age, having a university degree, being married or in a stable relationship (indicator), the mother/father working full-time/part-time (four indicators), considering religion as important, and country-region fixed effects. We report robust standard errors in parentheses in the country regressions, and clustered standard errors (at the country level) in the pooled regressions. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.14: Actual shares of men and women preferring female breadwinner model

	Germany		Italy		Poland		Spain		Sweden		US	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
1-child	19.2	16.1	11.6	7.0	15.4	8.0	15.5	5.5	16.3	10.2	25.6	20.0
		(0.20)		(0.01)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.03)
2-child	16.3	15.7	10.0	6.8	15.7	12.3	13.0	6.0	13.5	9.8	22.9	20.6
		(0.80)		(0.07)		(0.12)		(0.00)		(0.07)		(0.39)
Obs. (1)	572	428	571	429	560	440	547	453	570	430	559	441
Obs. (2)	572	428	571	429	560	440	547	453	570	430	559	441

Notes: This table displays the actual share of men and women preferring the female breadwinner model vis à vis couple equity in each country. Results are displayed for the 1-child scenario (first row) and 2-child scenario (second row). The shares are based on the responses of men and women to the baseline survey. The p-values for the equality test between men's shares and women's shares are displayed in parentheses below the perceived shares (two-sided t-test).

Table A.15: Actual shares of men and women always preferring specialization

	Germany		Italy		Poland		Spain		Sweden		US	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
1-child	6.6	8.6	6.5	3.3	10.9	2.7	7.1	2.2	7.5	6.5	13.2	10.4
		(0.24)		(0.02)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.53)		(0.17)
2-child	9.4	7.7	7.4	3.5	11.4	5.2	6.2	2.4	8.8	4.4	14.1	11.3
		(0.33)		(0.01)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.19)
Obs. (1)	572	428	571	429	560	440	547	453	570	430	559	441
Obs. (2)	572	428	571	429	560	440	547	453	570	430	559	441

Notes: This table displays the actual share of men and women who prefer household specialization, regardless of whether it is the man or the woman reducing work hours. Results are displayed for the 1-child scenario (first row) and 2-child scenario (second row). The shares are based on the responses of men and women to the baseline survey. The p-values for the equality test between men's shares and women's shares are displayed in parentheses below the perceived shares (two-sided t-test).

B Technical Appendix

B.1 Screening Criteria and Attention Checks

Several measures were put in place to ensure high data quality. First, potential participants are carefully screened by the survey company before they join the panel in order to ensure that survey responses are provided by individuals living in the country of interest. Second, careful checks are conducted to ensure there are no duplicates. Third, participants are screened out if they complete the survey in less than five minutes. Fourth, we build in two attention checks to maximize data quality. The first attention check is image-based and asks respondents to select a specific image among the ones provided in the answer option list. We randomize the order of answer options across respondents. The second attention check is text-based and asks respondents to select two out of five options among the ones provided. Respondents who fail either attention check are screened out.

B.2 Translations

The original survey was scripted in English and deployed in the United States. We used a state-of-the art procedure to translate the original English survey into the official languages of the other countries. The translations were performed by the team members and a team of professional translators from the survey company, *Pureprofile*. First, native speakers translated the English survey into the five respective languages. Second, a reviewer carefully checked the translations and identified any issues, suggesting alternative wordings, and explaining their comments. Third, the original translator received this feedback and could incorporate the comments. In case the original translator disagreed with the suggestions, there was further exchange between the translator and the reviewer, until an agreement was reached.

We note that our respondents were presented with hypothetical situations in which they were asked to imagine that they had a young child (or two young children). The original English version of the questionnaire deliberately does not refer to a specific gender when describing the child/children. For languages in which a gender-neutral word for 'child' does not

exist, we kept the gender of the child neutral in the scenarios by using the 'male child/female child' phrasing wherever applicable (e.g., 'bambino/bambina').

B.3 Quota-based Sampling Approach

We use a quota-based sampling approach to ensure that our samples are largely representative of the populations of interest in terms of gender, education, and region. The populations of interest for this study are adults without children between the ages of 18 and 45, resident in each respective country. We use the same quota-based sampling procedure for each country and survey wave.

Data Sources: We calculate the quotas based on population statistics that we derive from different data sources. For Italy, Poland, Spain, and Sweden, the national population figures are derived from the 2021 EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC, Microdata 2004-2021) (Eurostat, 2023). For Germany, the statistics are derived from the 2019 German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP; version 36eu) (Goebel et al., 2019). For the US, the population figures are derived from the 2022-2023 Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) of the Current Population Survey (CPS) provided by IPUMS (Flood and Westberry, 2023).

Education Categories: We categorize respondents based on their educational attainment into two main groups: respondents with/without a university degree. For each country, we use country-specific questions to collect information on each respondent's highest level of education. These country-specific categories are subsequently mapped to International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) categories. The final classification is then mapped into the quotas for 'University Degree' or 'No University Degree' as reported in Table B.1

Groups of Regions: For each country, we group several regions for the purpose of calculating the quotas. In the US, broad regions correspond to the standard four macro-regions (groups of states). In the other countries, quota groups are based on NUTS1 or NUTS2

Table B.1: Education categories

ISCED	Category	Quota
0	Early childhood education	No university degree
1	Primary education	No university degree
2	Lower secondary education	No university degree
3	Upper secondary education	No university degree
4	Post-secondary non-tertiary education	No university degree
5	Short-cycle tertiary education	University degree
6	Bachelor's or equivalent level	University degree
7	Master's or equivalent level	University degree
8	Doctoral or equivalent level	University degree

Notes: This table shows the ISCED categories that we used to classify respondents according to their highest level of educational attainment.

regions. We assign respondents to each quota based on the region groups reported in Table B.2.

Table B.2: Region quota

Country	Code	Regions
Germany	1	Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Brandenburg, Berlin, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt, Thüringen
	2	Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Niedersachsen, Bremen
	3	Baden-Württemberg, Rheinland-Pfalz, Saarland, Hessen
	4	Bayern
	5	Nordrhein-Westfalen
Italy	1	Liguria, Lombardia, Piemonte Valle d'Aosta
	2	Emilia-Romagna, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Veneto, Trentino-Alto Adige
	3	Marche, Lazio, Toscana, Umbria
	4	Abruzzo, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Molise, Puglia
	5	Sardegna, Sicilia
Poland	1	Małopolskie, Ślaskie
	2	Wielkopolskie, Zachodniopomorskie, Lubuskie
	3	Dolnośląskie, Opolskie
	4	Kujawsko-pomorskie, Warmińsko-mazurskie, Pomorskie
	5	Łódzkie, Świetokrzyskie
	6	Lubelskie, Podkarpackie, Podlaskie
	7	Warszawski stołeczny, Mazowiecki regionalny
Spain	1	Galicia, Principado de Asturias, Cantabria
	2	País Vasco, Com. Foral de Navarra, La Rioja, Aragón
	3	Comunidad de Madrid
	4	Castilla y León, Castilla-La Mancha, Extremadura
	5	Cataluña, Comunitat Valenciana, Illes Balears
	6	Andalucía, Región de Murcia, Ciudad de Ceuta, Ciudad de Melilla
	7	Canarias
Sweden	1	Stockholm, Östra Mellansverige
	2	Småland med öarna, Sydsverige, Västsverige
	3	Norra Mellansverige, Mellersta Norrland, Övre Norrland
US	1	Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania
	2	Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota
	3	Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, Washington, D.C., West Virginia, Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas
	4	Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming, Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington

Notes: This table shows the regional categories that we used to compute regional quotas. In the US, broad regions correspond to the standard four macro-regions (groups of states). In the other countries, quota groups are based on NUTS1 or NUTS2 regions.

B.4 Salary Figures: Preferences for Couple Equity

In all six countries, we use a common methodology to determine the salary figures for the question we use to elicit individual preferences for couple equity. First, we calculate the average gross yearly income of full-time workers (aged between 18 and 45 with one child) in each of the six countries from the GSOEP (Germany), CPS (United States) and EU-SILC data, assuming a 40-hour work week. We then compute the salary figures for the two time allocations by calculating the pro-rata equivalent of these full-time earnings for 35-, 20- and 50-hour work weeks. For example, we use data from the GSOEP to compute the average salary of a full-time worker with the given characteristics in Germany working 40 hours per week, which is approximately 40,000 €. Keeping the hourly wage constant, the implied yearly salary for someone working 35 hours per week is 35,000 €, and it is 20,000 € for someone working 20 hours per week. When necessary, we round our salary figures slightly for better readability. From these calculations, we determine the total household income for the benchmark scenario in each country: 70,000 € in Germany, 50,000 € in Italy, 100,000 zł in Poland, 40,000 € in Spain, 670,000 kr in Sweden, and $90,000 in the United States.

We note that while in all countries respondents were presented with two alternatives that had the same *gross* household income, the *net* income across the two options may not be the same. Country-specific features of the taxation system, such as the level of progressivity of the tax schedule and/or the unit of taxation (individual vs joint household taxation), may make couple equity more or less costly in terms of total net household income, in comparison to the male breadwinner model. We use the OECD Tax-Benefit Web Calculator (OECD, 2023) to compute the amount of net household income that would be foregone if a couple chooses the male breadwinner allocation in our benchmark scenario, conditional on the prevalent taxation system in each country. For the purpose of this calculation, we set the model to compute the net household income of a couple where both couple members are 32 years old and have a 3-year-old child. In the calculation, we further included all deductions related to in-work and family benefits, but excluded deductions for childcare costs. All calculations refer to the fiscal year 2023. Our calculations reveal that the monetary cost to choosing the male breadwinner allocation in our benchmark scenario (as % of household

income) equals -0.18% for Germany, 0% for the United States and Poland, 0.43% for Sweden, 1.24% for Spain and 1.58% for Italy.

B.5 Eliciting WTP for Couple Equity: The Staircase Method

We exploit the staircase method to obtain a quantitative measure of respondents' WTP for couple equity. The staircase method works as follows. After having answered the first question about preferences for couple equity when household income is constant across the two options (see Section 3.1), respondents are asked a series of sequential questions that are identical to the first one in all details, except for the earnings of the male partner (and thus total household income) in option B. If a respondent chooses the couple equity option as a response to the first question, we increase the earnings of the male partner in the male breadwinner option in the subsequent question, thus making couple equity more costly. If instead the participant chooses the male breadwinner allocation, we decrease the earnings of the male partner in option B in the following question, thus making couple equity less costly. Similarly, we make the couple equity option more or less costly in the third question depending on whether the respondent expressed a preference for couple equity or for the male breadwinner model in the second question of the staircase, respectively. We repeat this procedure a maximum of four times, which allows us to elicit WTP for couple equity in interval brackets of 4,000€ for Germany.

Figure B.1 shows a graphical representation of the staircase method as implemented in Germany to elicit WTP for couple equity. Each node corresponds to the total household income from option B, the *male breadwinner model*. Household income in option A remains constant throughout the staircase, and set at the value corresponding to the starting node of the staircase. At each subsequent node, moving up the staircase (or choosing option A) makes the couple equity scenario more costly, whereas moving down the staircase makes it less costly.

We calculate a respondent's WTP for couple equity as the difference between the highest total household income that a respondent is willing to give up in favor of an equal division of tasks and total household income in the initial scenario. Positive values of our WTP measure

indicate that respondents are willing to give up household income in order to allocate all tasks equally between couple members. Negative amounts indicate that respondents would only prefer the couple equity allocation in cases where it yielded higher household income than the male breadwinner model.

In order to adapt the staircase method to all countries, we take the staircase in the German survey as a benchmark. First, we fix the baseline salary figures and household income of the first question in the staircase so that for each country these values are calculated from national population statistics on the average salary of full-time workers in all countries. We note that these figures also align with the scenarios presented to our baseline survey respondents. Then, we set the size of the final step of the staircase by using the current final step in the German staircase, which is set at 4,000 € as a reference. In particular, in each country we ensure that the size of the last step (or the difference in total household income in option B between the penultimate and the last question of the staircase) corresponds to approximately the same percentage of the country's household income in the baseline scenario. In other words, given that $4,000$ € represents approximately 5.7% of the baseline household income in Germany, we calculate the final step sizes for other countries to approximately maintain this consistent ratio. With our initial household income and final step defined, we proceeded by backward induction to compute the amounts for all steps of the staircase, except for the two cases outlined below.

In the case where respondents consistently choose option B - '*Male Breadwinner*', we set the total household income in option B of the last question as equal to the woman's part-time wage. This results in no income earned by the man in option B.

For respondents consistently choosing option A - '*Couple Equity*', we use a multiple choice question to further inquire at what income level they would be willing to switch to option B - '*Male Breadwinner*'. In Table B.3, we provide the options shown to participants in all countries.

Figure B.1: Staircase method to measure WTP for couple equity



Notes: The graph shows a graphical representation of the staircase method that we use to elicit respondents' WTP for couple equity, as implemented in the German survey. Each node displays the value of total gross household income in option B – '*Male breadwinner*'. Total household income in option A – '*Couple Equity*' – is always fixed at 70,000 gross per year in Germany. Respondents move up the staircase when choosing option A – '*Couple equity*' in a given question, and they move down when expressing a stated preference for option B – '*Male breadwinner*'.

Table B.3: Multiple choice question by country

	Germany	Italy	Poland
Option 1	€130 000 - €139 999	€87 500 - €89 999	175 000 - 179 999 zł
Option 2	€140 000 - €149,999	€90 000 - €94 999	180 000 - 189 999 zł
Option 3	€150 000 - €159 999	€95 000 - €99 999	190 000 - 199 999 zł
Option 4	€160 000 - €169 999	€100 000 - €104999	200 000 - 209 999 zł
Option 5	More than €170 000	More than €105 000	More than 210 000 zł
	Spain	Sweden	United States
Option 1	€70 000 - €74 999	1 195 000 - 1 249 999 kr	$165 000 - $169,999
Option 2	€75 000 - €79 999	1 250 000 - 1 349 999 kr	$170 000 - $179 999
Option 3	€80 000 - €84 999	1 350 000 - 1 449 999 kr	$180 000 - $189 999
Option 4	€85 000 - €89 999	1 450 000 - 1 549 999 kr	$190 000 - $199 999
Option 5	More than €90 000	More than 1 550 000 kr	More than $200 000

Notes: This table shows, for each country, the five options displayed in the multiple choice question that participants reached when always choosing option A 'Couple equity' in the previous questions of the staircase. In this last multiple choice question, participants who consistently chose option A *'Couple equity'* are asked at what income level they would be willing to switch to option B '*Male Breadwinner*'.

B.6 List Experiment

To examine whether social desirability bias may be a driver of the misperception finding, we conduct a 'list experiment' in the baseline survey. We closely follow the approach used in Bursztyn, González and Yanagizawa-Drott (2020). We randomly assign participants into one of two groups: a control group and a treatment group. In both conditions, all participants are asked to indicate the *number* of statements they agree with from a list of statements. In the control condition, the list includes four statements, whereas in the treatment condition the list includes the same four statements from the control list but also the statement of interest ('*Women and men should be equally involved in the upbringing of their children.*'). Moreover, the control group is also asked directly whether or not they agree with the statement that 'women and men should be equally involved in the upbringing of their children'. We can compare the percentage of people agreeing to this statement in the control group (direct elicitation), to the implied degree of support we obtain at the sample level when we compare the average number of statements supported in the treatment and control conditions.

B.7 Pre-registration

We pre-registered the experimental design, the sampling approach, and the main analyses of our main survey at the AEA RCT Registry (AEARCTR-0012817 and AEARCTR-0012926). This section notes deviations from the pre-analysis plan:

- One of our main outcomes of interest is respondents' WTP for couple equity, which we calculate from responses to our staircase question. Our measure of WTP has absolute values that depend on the income levels used for the staircase questions, and which thus differ across the six countries in our study. For ease of interpretation and comparability of the results across countries, we calculate a measure of 'Relative WTP' for couple equity as respondents' WTP divided by the baseline household income in the first question of the staircase module, multiplied by 100. The resulting relative WTP can thus be interpreted in percentage terms, relative to the baseline household income.

- In addition to analyzing treatment effects separately for the six countries in our sample, as pre-registered in our PAP, we additionally compute treatment effects (and examine treatment effect heterogeneity) in regressions that pool respondents from all six countries.

- In our PAP we pre-specified as an additional secondary outcome a composite measure of perceived returns to couple equity relative to the male breadwinner allocation. We do not include this outcome in our analyses as we did not identify any significant treatment effect on perceived returns, and we did not detect significant correlations between this measure of perceived returns to couple equity and respondents' own preference for couple equity.

C Questionnaire

In this section, we present the survey structure of the baseline and main survey, see Figure C.1 and Figure C.2, respectively. The following subsections include the exact wording of the main survey modules. To illustrate, we use Germany as an example when presenting the survey questions.

Figure C.1: Order of survey blocks - Baseline survey



Notes: The diagram shows the order of the different survey blocks as presented to respondents to our baseline survey. The survey structure is identical for all countries in the study. Respondents were randomized into the 'truthful' or 'stated' condition.

Figure C.2: Order of survey blocks - Main survey



Notes: The diagram shows the order of the different blocks as presented to respondents to our main surveys (wave 2). The survey structure is identical for all countries in the study.

C.1 Baseline Survey: Preferences for Couple Equity

In this survey, you will encounter a series of **thought experiments** that require you to envision yourself in hypothetical future situations.

We acknowledge that different people have diverse life experiences and that the presented scenarios may not align with your own envisioned future. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this study, we would like to ask you to **imagine yourself in the scenarios to the best of your ability** and reflect upon them carefully.

——————— Page Break ———————

Couples with young children often face the challenge of balancing work and family life. **Regardless of your current family situation**, we would like to ask you to imagine the following thought experiment.[30]

You must now decide how you and your partner would divide household chores, childcare, and paid work among yourselves. **What would you personally prefer?**

[30] Female respondents viewed similar scenarios in which they had to imagine being in a couple with a male partner. Both male and female respondents had to hypothetically choose between couple equity and the traditional male breadwinner model (displayed in the text), as well as between couple equity and a female breadwinner model. Both questions were asked for a 1-child scenario (displayed in the text) as well as a 2-child scenario (both children below the age of 5). The questions for female and male respondents were otherwise identical.

Would you prefer it if you and your partner split all tasks equally? Or would you prefer it if, **on weekdays**, one person mainly takes care of the household chores and childcare, while the other person mainly goes to work?

In all of the following scenarios, please assume that **during the weekend** you would share all household chores and childcare equally, and neither you nor your partner would work outside the home.

——————— Page Break ———————

What would you personally prefer?

Note that in both options, the total gross income available to you and your partner is the same, although the net income may differ between the two options.



In option A, **you and your partner each work 35 hours a week** and each earn 35,000 € gross per year. You and your partner then **equally take care of the child and household chores** on weekdays.



In option B, **you work 50 hours per week and earn 50,000 € gross per year**, while your partner works 20 hours a week and earns 20,000 € gross per year. **Your partner mainly takes care of the child and household chores** on weekdays.[31]

C.2 Baseline Survey: Belief Elicitation

We are interested in your opinion on what other people think.

As part of this study, we interviewed many people in Germany who do not have children and are between the ages of 18 and 45. The participants came from different parts of the country and their answers represent the views and opinions of people in Germany. Now we would like you to guess how other study participants answered the previous question. As a reminder, below are the options that participants had to choose from:[32]

Option A. Equal division of labor

You and your partner each work 35 hours a week and each earn 35,000 € gross per year. You and your partner then equally take care of the child and household chores on weekdays.

Option B. You focus on paid work

Your partner works 20 hours per week and earns 20,000 € gross per year, while you work 50 hours a week and earn 50,000 € gross per year. Your partner mainly takes care of the child and household chores on weekdays.

Out of 100 men we surveyed, how many do you think state they prefer each of the following two options? [asked to participants who were randomized into the 'Stated' version of the question]

Please use integer numbers. Remember, your answers need to sum to 100.

- Number of men stating they prefer **equal division of labor** (option A)

[31] The salary figures presented here are the ones shown to respondents in Germany.

[32] The following options illustrate the way in which this question was presented to male participants. The questions were reformulated accordingly for female respondents.

- Number of men stating they prefer to **focus on paid work** (option B)

Regardless of what they said to us, out of 100 men we surveyed, how many do you think truly prefer each of the following two options? [asked to participants who were randomized into the 'truthful' version of the question]

- Number of men who truly prefer prefer **equal division of labor** (option A)
- Number of men who truly prefer to **focus on paid work** (option B)

C.3 Main Survey: Belief Elicitation

Bonus payment possible

There are several questions in this survey, in which we ask you to guess how other respondents answered a question. These questions are flagged with the sign:

You can earn a bonus of 1€. This works as follows: We will randomly select one of the flagged questions. If your response to this question is correct, 1€ will be added to your account.

Page Break

We are interested in your opinion on what other people think.

Couples with young children often face the challenge of balancing work and family life. We recently surveyed 1,000 people in Germany to obtain a better understanding of how men and women **would personally prefer** to divide different tasks within the household if they had young children.

The 1,000 people we surveyed did not have children and were between the ages of 18 and 45. The participants came from different parts of the country and their answers represent the views and opinions of people in Germany.

For the purpose of our study, we asked all survey participants to **imagine hypothetical future situations** in which they have a child. We will now show you the first hypothetical situation that the men who participated in our survey had to imagine themselves in, as well as the precise question they had to answer. We will **then ask you to guess** what they responded, so please read the information carefully.

——————— Page Break ———————

Here is the hypothetical situation men were asked to imagine.

Couples with young children often face the challenge of balancing work and family life. **Regardless of your current family situation**, we would like to ask you to imagine the following thought experiment.

This is **you**

This is your **partner**

You have a **three-year-old child** together

and you are **married**

You must now decide how you and your partner would divide household chores, childcare, and paid work. **What would you personally prefer?**

Would you prefer it if you and your partner split all tasks equally? Or would you prefer it if, **on weekdays**, one person mainly takes care of the household chores and childcare, while the other person mainly goes to work?

In all of the following scenarios, please assume that **during the weekend** you would share all household chores and childcare equally, and neither you nor your partner would work outside the home.

Please continue to the following screen to see which question men were asked to answer.

Page Break

Here is the precise question men were asked to answer.

What would you personally prefer?

Note that in both options, the total gross income available to you and your partner is the same, although the net income may differ between the two options.



In option A, **you and your partner each work 35 hours a week** and each earn 35,000 € gross per year. You and your partner then **equally take care of the child and household chores** on weekdays.



In option B, **you work 50 hours per week and earn 50,000 € gross per year**, while your partner works 20 hours a week and earns 20,000 € gross per year. **Your partner mainly takes care of the child and household chores** on weekdays.

Please continue to the following screen to provide your guess on what the men who participated in our survey responded.

Page Break

Out of 100 men we surveyed, how many do you think state they prefer each of the following two options?

Please use integer numbers. Remember, your answers need to sum to 100.

- Number of men stating they prefer an **equal division of labor** (option A)
- Number of men stating they prefer to **focus on paid work** (option B)

C.4 Main Survey: Information Treatment

This information is randomly shown to approximately half the sample (treatment group) at this point in the survey; the remaining half of the sample (control group) will see the same information at the very end of the survey.

On the next page, you will learn how **men in Germany** responded. Please read the information carefully.

Page Break

Here are the results: [*Example: the respondent underestimated the actual share*]

Two-second pause before displaying the information below.

74% of men state they prefer an equal division of labor (option A), while 26% of men state they prefer to focus on paid work (option B).



You **underestimated** the percentage of men preferring an equal division of labor by [**74 - guess**] **percentage points**.[33]

C.5 Main Survey: Post-Treatment Beliefs

What do you think men responded when being presented with the same two options but in a second hypothetical future situation? In this second hypothetical situation, men were

[33] If the respondent overestimated the actual share, this sentence will read 'You **overestimated** the percentage of men preferring an equal division of labor by [**guess - 74**] **percentage points**.' If the respondent guessed the actual share correctly, this sentence will read 'Your guess was **correct**.'

asked to imagine that they have **two children** instead of one, both under the age of five. Apart from this difference, the question was otherwise identical.

Out of 100 men we surveyed, how many do you think state they prefer each of the following two options?

Please use integer numbers. Remember, your answers need to sum to 100.

- Number of men stating they prefer an **equal division of labor** (option A)
- Number of men stating they prefer to **focus on paid work** (option B)

C.6 Main Survey: Preferences for Couple Equity

Next you will encounter a series of thought experiments that require you to envision yourself in hypothetical future situations.

We acknowledge that different people have diverse life experiences and that the presented scenarios may not align with your own envisioned future. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this study, we would like to **ask you to imagine yourself in the scenarios to the best of your ability** and reflect upon them carefully.

Page Break

Couples with young children often face the challenge of balancing work and family life. **Regardless of your current family situation**, we would like to ask you to imagine the following thought experiment.[34]

You must now decide how you and your partner would divide household chores, childcare, and paid work among yourselves. **What would you personally prefer**?

Would you prefer it if you and your partner split all tasks equally? Or would you prefer it if, **on weekdays**, one person mainly takes care of the household chores and childcare, while the other person mainly goes to work?

[34]Female respondents viewed similar scenarios in which they have to imagine being in a couple with a male partner. Both male and female respondents had to hypothetically choose between couple equity and the traditional male breadwinner model. The questions for female and male respondents were otherwise identical.



In all of the following scenarios, please assume that **during the weekend**, you would share all household chores and childcare equally, and neither you nor your partner would work outside the home.

Page Break

What would you personally prefer?

Note that in both options the total gross income available to you and your partner is the same, although the net income may differ between the two options.



In option A, **you and your partner each work 35 hours a week** and each earn 35,000 € gross per year. You and your partner then **equally take care of the child and household chores** on weekdays.



In option B, **you work 50 hours per week and earn 50,000 € gross per year**, while your partner works 20 hours a week and earns 20,000 € gross per year. **Your partner mainly takes care of the child and household chores** on weekdays.

C.7 Main Survey: WTP for Couple Equity (Staircase Method)

You will now be presented with several similar questions. The only difference is that the amount **you would earn in option B** will be different[35]. As a result, total gross household income will differ across the two options.

Page Break

C.7.1 Example I: The respondent chooses option A (Couple Equity) in the initial question

What would you personally prefer?



[35]For female respondents: 'The only difference is the amount that the amount **your partner would earn in option B** will be different'.

- In option A, **you and your partner each work 35 hours a week** and each earn 35,000 € gross per year. You and your partner then **equally take care of the child and household chores** on weekdays.



- In option B, **you work 50 hours per week and earn 82,000 € gross per year**, while your partner works 20 hours a week and earns 20,000 € gross per year. **Your partner mainly takes care of the child and household chores** on weekdays.

C.7.2 Example II: The respondent chooses option B (Male Breadwinner) in the initial question

What would you personally prefer?



- In option A, **you and your partner each work 35 hours a week** and each earn 35,000 € gross per year. You and your partner then **equally take care of the child and household chores** on weekdays.



- In option B, **you work 50 hours per week and earn 18,000 € gross per year**, while your partner works 20 hours a week and earns 20,000 € gross per year. **Your partner mainly takes care of the child and household chores** on weekdays.

C.7.3 Example III: The respondent chooses option A (Couple Equity) in the initial question, and again in the second question he faces (Example I)

What would you personally prefer?



- In option A, **you and your partner each work 35 hours a week** and each earn 35,000 € gross per year. You and your partner then **equally take care of the child and household chores** on weekdays.



- In option B, **you work 50 hours per week and earn 98,000 € gross per year**, while your partner works 20 hours a week and earns 20,000 € gross per year. **Your partner mainly takes care of the child and household chores** on weekdays.

C.8 Main Survey: Donation Decision

Please pay special attention to the next question in which you will make a decision about money. We will randomly select 10 respondents. If you are among them, your decision will be a real decision. The decision will be implemented, and you can receive up to 80 €. Here is the decision: You can divide 80 € between yourself and a charitable organization. The amount that you keep for yourself will be added to your account. The amount that you donate will go to the charity *MenCare*. The charity's mission is to promote men's involvement as equitable fathers and caregivers in order to achieve family well-being, gender equality, and better health for mothers, fathers, and children. *MenCare* collaborates with partner organizations around the world to actively engage men in fatherhood, in caregiving, and in maternal, newborn, and child health. You can find more information on *MenCare* here. How much of the 80 € would you like to donate to *MenCare*?

- Donation to *MenCare* (€) [scale: 0-80]

C.9 Main Survey: Policy Preferences

To what extent do you agree with the following statement: [Strongly disagree/disagree/neither agree nor disagree/agree/strongly agree]

- The national government should do more to promote the involvement of fathers in the upbringing of their children.